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I. Introduction: Stand or Retreat
Someone is threatening you with imminent and deadly force. You
could safely retreat from the threat but you choose, instead, to stand your
ground and meet force with force. In doing so, you kill the aggressor. Are
you guilty of murder?
In most of the United States, the answer is no. By statute, court rul-
ings, or a combination of both, more than thirty states have adopted a
"Stand Your Ground" (No Retreat) rule which bars the prosecution of peo-
ple who use deadly force against a deadly aggressor without first attempting
to retreat, or offers such persons a valid self-defense claim against a charge
of criminal homicide.' By contrast, a minority of states enforce a "Retreat"
requirement, or "Duty to Retreat," under which a defendant may not suc-
cessfully claim self-defense if the defendant could have safely retreated, but
did not, before using deadly force against a deadly attacker. 2
A longstanding legal debate between the Retreat and Stand Your
Ground approaches erupted onto the national landscape in the summer of
2013, after a Florida jury acquitted George Zimmerman in the shooting
1. "Stand Your Ground" Policy Summary, LAW CENTER TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE (July 18,
2013), http://smartgunlaws.org/stand-your-ground-policy-summary. Since 2005, 26 states have adopted
statutory No Retreat rules, and an additional seven states have adopted some form of Stand Your
Ground approach through a combination of court rulings, statutory provisions, and jury instructions. See,
e.g., FLA. STAT. § 776.032(1) (2014) ("A person who uses or threatens to use force as permitted in s.
776.012, s. 776.013, or s. 776.031 is justified in such conduct and is immune from criminal prosecution
and civil action for the use or threatened use of such force . . . ."); Dorsey v. State, 74 So. 3d 521, 526
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (discussing the legislative intent of section 776.013 that was to "[abolish] the
common law duty to retreat," the favorable jury instructions provided by the 'Stand Your Ground' in-
struction" to the defendant, and the creation of "a new affirmative defense" where a person may use
deadly force without first retreating).
Under § 776.012, a person's use of deadly force is justified "if he or she reasonably believes that
using or threatening to use such force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to
himself or herself or another or to prevent the imminent commission of a forcible felony." FLA. STAT. §
776.012(2) (2014). in such a situation, the person "does not have a duty to retreat and has the right to
stand his or her ground if the person . . . is not engaged in a criminal activity and is in a place where he
or she has a right to be." Id.
2. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-19(b) (2014) ("[A] person is not justified in using deadly
physical force upon another person if he or she knows that he or she can avoid the necessity of using
such force with complete safety (1) by retreating .... ); see also Burch v. State, 696 A.2d 443, 458
(Md. 1997) (citations omitted) (noting that Maryland's common-law retreat rule provides that a person
has a duty "to retreat or avoid danger if such means were within his power and consistent with his safe-
ty" as an essential element to self-defense); DeVaughn v. State, 194 A.2d 109, 112 (Md. 1963) ("[T]he
distinction that is made between defense of the home and defense of the person is merely that in the
former there is no duty to retreat.").
The Model Penal Code (MPC) also proposes a retreat rule under which deadly force is not justifia-
ble if the actor knows "he can avoid the necessity of using such force with complete safety by retreating
or by surrendering possession of a thing to a person asserting a claim of right thereto or by complying
with a demand that he abstain from any action which he has no duty to take." MODEL PENAL CODE §
3.04(2)(b) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). Like the criminal codes of most Retreat states, the MPC in-
cludes a version of the Castle Doctrine, providing that persons are not required to retreat if they are
faced with a deadly assault in their home and did not provoke or initiate that assault. Id. §
3.04(2)(b)(ii)(i).
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death of Trayvon Martin.' The facts suggest that Florida's Stand Your
Ground law had (at best) only a distant connection to the shooting of
Trayvon Martin and to the subsequent acquittal of Zimmerman on multiple
homicide charges.4 Nonetheless, the political tsunami generated by the
Zimmerman case has cut the Stand Your Ground doctrine from its historical
moorings and obscured its purpose, role, and impact on the law of self-
defense.s
3. See Arian Camp-Flores & Lynn Waddell, Jury Acquits Zimmerman ofAll Charges, WALL ST. J.
(July 14, 2013, 7:21 AM),http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SBl0001424127887324879504578603562
762064502 ("[The Zimmerman case] set off nationwide protests and searing debates over racial justice
and self-defense laws.").
4. See Zimmerman to Argue Self-Defense, Will Not Seek "Stand Your Ground" Hearing, CNN
(May 1, 2013, 5:43 AM), www.cnn.com/2013/04/30/justice/florida-zimmerman-defense/ (noting that
Mr. Zimmerman's attorneys waived his right to a Stand Your Ground pretrial immunity hearing, opting
instead to try the case as one of self-defense); see also infra text accompanying note 5 (discussing con-
troversy over relevance of Stand Your Ground to the jury's verdict in the Zimmerman case).
5. Three especially incendiary charges are that Stand Your Ground laws are inherently racist, that
the wave of recently enacted Stand Your Ground statutes resulted from a campaign to promote gun
ownership that was spearheaded by the National Rifle Association, and that the Stand Your Ground ap-
proach encourages and increases the rate of deadly violence generally. See Alyssa Giannirakis, Tavis
Smiley: You Can 'Stand Your Ground Unless You Are a Black Man', ABC NEWS (July 14, 2013, 10:56
AM), www.abcnews.go.com/Politics/tavis-smiley-you-can-stand-your-ground-unless-you-are-a-black-
man/blogEntry?id=19662909 (quoting comments by radio talk show host Tavis Smiley on ABC News's
'This Week With George Stephanopoulus': "It appears to me, and I think many other persons in this
country, that you can in fact stand your ground unless you are a black man."). A number of celebrities
have decided to boycott Florida or all Stand Your Ground states until the laws are repealed, principally
on grounds that Stand Your Ground laws are racist. E.g., Alan Duke, Stevie Wonder Says He 'll Boycott
'Stand Your Ground' States, CNN (July 17, 2013, 9:32 AM), www.cnn.com/2013/7/16/showbiz/stevie-
wonder-florida-boycott (quoting Stevie Wonder, who told an audience at a concert in Quebec that wher-
ever a Stand Your Ground law exists, he "will not perform in that state or in that part of the world"). The
controversy continued in 2014 with such nationally promoted events as "Stand Your Ground Week" in
Florida. See Keitha Nelson, 'Standing Our Ground Week' Begins in Jacksonville, FIRST COAST NEWS
(July 25, 2014, 11:38 PM), www.firstcoastnews.com/story/news/local/2014/07/25/marissa-alexander-
stand-your-ground/13195383/ (describing events organized to bring awareness to the trial of Marissa
Alexander, who was repeatedly denied a Stand Your Ground Hearing after allegedly shooting at her
estranged husband and his children).
Thus far, the post-Zimmerman scholarly literature has generally echoed, or expanded, these con-
cerns, at least in the legal academy. See generally D. Marvin Jones, He's a Black Male . .. Something is
Wrong With Him!, 68 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1025 (2014) (linking the proponents of Stand Your Ground, and
the acquittal of George Zimmerman, with an underlying racist "culture of fear" which associates black
men with danger and crime); 2014 Annual Meeting Program: Session Details, Self-Defense, Stand Your
Ground Laws, and the Shooting of Trayvon Martin, Ass'N OF Am. LAW SCH.,
https://memberaccess.aals.org/eweb/DynamicPage.aspx?Site=AALS&WebKey-d2dOf6f9-5d93-4b37-
8671-6dfac46c48ad&RegPath=EventRegFees&REg evt key-70c8b3ea-5ec9-404d-b7ec-
88f6blfa3020&ParentObject-CentralizedOrderEntry&ParentDataObject-Registrant&DoNotSave=yes
&action=Add ("This panel will explore the applicable law, race, and masculinity, using a multidiscipli-
nary approach. Issues covered will include . . . how implicit racial bias can influence juror perceptions of
reasonableness in self-defense; and the dialogic relationship between race, masculinity and the criminal
law.").
Especially surprising has been the frequency with which expert commentators, including expert le-
gal commentators, have misrepresented the basic law of self-defense in this discussion. See, e.g., Robert
Leider, Understanding Stand Your Ground, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 18, 2012, 6:58 PM),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304432704577350010609562008.html ("Jeffrey
Toobin, CNN senior legal analyst, erroneously claimed that the [Florida Stand Your Ground] law 'al-
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Misinformed politics can produce bad law, and that may well hap-
pen here. A Florida task force appointed in 2012 by Governor Rick Scott
recommended preserving the Sunshine State's Stand Your Ground statute
with minor corrections.' Reaction at the federal level was more dramatic.
Shortly after George Zimmerman's acquittal, President Barack Obama sug-
gested that it was time for states to reassess the Stand Your Ground ap-
proach. The President said:
[F]or those who resist the idea that we should think about
something like these 'stand your ground' laws, I'd just ask
people to consider, if Trayvon Martin was of age and armed,
could he have stood his ground on that sidewalk? And do we
actually think that he would have been justified in shooting
Mr. Zimmerman, who had followed him in a car, because he
felt threatened? And if the answer to that question is at least
ambiguous, then it seems to me that we might want to exam-
ine those kinds of laws.7
U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder went further, affirmatively con-
demning Stand Your Ground laws and declaring, "These laws try to fix
something that was never broken."' The Attorney General opined: "[I]t's
time to question laws that senselessly expand the concept of self-defense
and sow dangerous conflict . . .. [S]uch laws undermine public safety....
[W]e must ... take a hard look at laws that contribute to more violence than
they prevent."'
Such statements contain a number of factual assertions that call
lows a disproportionate response: if someone comes at you with a fist, you can reply with a gun."'). As
Leider points out: "Many have asserted that in Florida anyone who believes he is in danger can use
deadly force. . . . These perceptions of the law are wrong. . . . [A] person must also reasonably believe
that the aggressor threatened him with death, great bodily injury, or intended to commit a forcible felony
..... Id.; see also infra Part Ill.A (discussing various doctrinal confusions which have muddied the pub-
lic discussion of Stand Your Ground).
6. Bill Cotterell, Florida Task Force Recommends Preserving Stand Your Ground Law, REUTERS,
Feb. 22, 2013, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/22/us-usa-florida-guns-
idUSBRE91 Ll6120130222.
7. Transcript: Obama addresses race, profiling and FL law, CNN (July 19, 2013, 2:49 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2013/07/19/politics/obama-zimmerman-verdict/ [hereinafter Obamas Address].
The President also remarked, "I think it would be useful for us to examine some state and local laws to
see if they are designed in such a way that they may encourage the kind of altercations and confronta-
tions and tragedies that we saw in the Florida [Zimmerman] case, rather than [defuse] potential alterca-
tions." Id. Here the President seems to repeat a core misconception about Stand Your Ground laws-that
such laws require only that the defendant have subjectively felt threatened in order successfully to claim
that his or her use of deadly force was justified. This is most emphatically not the case, as I discuss infra
Part 111B.
8. Attorney General Eric Holder's Remarks on Trayvon Martin at NAACP Convention (full text)
[hereinafter Holder's Remarks], WASH. POST (July 16, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/
attomey-general-eric-holders-remarks-on-trayvon-martin-at-naacp-convention-full text/2013/07/16/dec8
2f88-ee5a-lle2-al f9-ea873b7e0424 story.html.
9. Id
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loudly for verification. Do Stand Your Ground statutes allow a person to
kill someone simply because the person feels threatened? Do they invidi-
ously discriminate on the basis of race? Do they "senselessly expand the
concept of self-defense"? Do they "sow dangerous conflict in our neighbor-
hoods"? Do they necessarily "undermine public safety"? Do they "contrib-
ute to more violence than they prevent"?
The political conversation about these laws has been so dominated
by bitter ideological disputes that the public has not been given a fair oppor-
tunity to study the Stand Your Ground approach or to assess its function
and impact.
This Article examines the historical background of Stand Your
Ground (No Retreat) rules in the United States and evaluates the various
reasons that might explain their current embrace by more than half the
country. Widespread adoption of a law does not necessarily make that law
right. But it does suggest the law may be animated by strongly held moral
intuitions that deserve exploration on their own merits. In identifying and
examining the moral intuitions that have proliferated the law of Stand Your
Ground, I hope not only to reach meaningful conclusions about the norma-
tive status of No Retreat rules in the law of self-defense, but also to raise a
more general concern about the influence of political ideology on the con-
tent of the criminal law.
Part II traces the evolution of Retreat and Stand Your Ground rules
in the United States, noting the roots of both approaches in English com-
mon-law doctrine dating back several centuries. Part III attempts to clear up
some confusions about self-defense law which may have clouded the public
debate over Stand Your Ground doctrine, and Part IV evaluates recent
claims that Stand Your Ground is inherently racist, violence-enhancing, or
both. I argue that none of these charges are justified. Like any other legal
rule, Stand Your Ground laws can be badly or inexpertly invoked and inter-
preted. But so far, at least, no one has persuasively demonstrated that Stand
Your Ground is inherently racist or that it increases the rate of gun violence
generally or unjustified killing in particular. Part V concludes by proposing
changes to both the Stand Your Ground and Retreat approaches, changes
that would return them to their original and most rationally defensible
mooring within the necessity element of self-defense. Properly housed in
the universally accepted rule of necessity, Stand Your Ground laws (1) can
shed the conceptual confusions that have produced so many over-heated
charges against them and (2) can serve the public's legitimate interest in
protecting the individual's right to use deadly force against an aggressor in
situations where such force is necessary to save innocent human life.
II. Self-Defense and the Duty to Retreat
Both the Retreat and Stand Your Ground approaches proceed from
the same core conception of self-defense and therefore have most founda-
tional elements in common. Although phrased somewhat differently by
2015] 93
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courts and legislatures in state jurisdictions, the justification of self-defense
contains four basic elements. To advance a self-defense claim when a de-
fendant has killed his or her attacker, the defendant must (1) be faced with a
threat of death or serious bodily injury from the attack; (2) the threatened
attack must be "imminent," in the plain-language sense that it is about to
happen right then; and the defendant at that moment must (3) honestly and
(4) reasonably believe that the use of deadly force is necessary to prevent
such injury or death.10 Again, self-defense doctrine shares these core ele-
ments in both Retreat and Stand Your Ground jurisdictions.
A. Core Elements of Self-Defense
These core elements of self-defense have generated a shared set of
judicial and statutory corollaries.
First, among the minority of states that enforces a Duty to Retreat,
that duty generally does not apply when a defendant is attacked in his or her
own residence." In the 1914 New York case People v. Tomlins,12 Justice
Benjamin Cardozo explained the basis of this Castle Doctrine": "It is not
now and never has been the law that a man assailed in his own dwelling is
bound to retreat ... If assailed there, he may stand his ground and resist the
attack."l4
Thus, even in Retreat rule states, the No Retreat principle applies in
the important setting of the home. The difference between Retreat and
Stand Your Ground concerns the law as it relates to deadly confrontations
outside the home.
Second, in both Retreat and Stand Your Ground jurisdictions, self-
defense claims are frequently permitted not only in cases where the defend-
er honestly and reasonably believed that the assailant had the conscious
purpose of killing, but also in cases where defenders used deadly force to
retaliate against an aggressor who was attempting to commit a serious felo-
10. See United States v. Peterson, 483 F.2d 1222, 1229-30 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (discussing what is
required for a valid self-defense claim).
11. See, e.g., DeVaughn v. State, 194 A.2d 109, 112 (Md. 1963) (stating that, in Maryland, though
there is a duty to retreat when defending one's person, there is no such duty when defending one's
"home or 'castle').
12. People v. Tomlins, 107 N.E. 496 (N.Y. 1914).
13. Some modem commentators refer to Stand Your Ground laws as "Castle" laws. See, e.g.,
Tamara Rice Lave, Shoot to Kill: A Critical Look at Stand Your Ground Laws, 67 U. MIAMI L. REV.
827, 831 (2013) ("This article takes a critical look at expanded self-defense laws . .. known as 'Castle'
or 'Stand Your Ground' laws."). In this article, I use "Stand Your Ground" as synonymous with the "No
Retreat" approach to self-defense, and the "Castle Doctrine" refers to the particular rule which applies in
some Duty to Retreat states, creating an exception to that duty when an innocent person is assaulted with
deadly force in his or her home. See SANFORD H. KADISH, STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CAROL S. STEIKER
& RACHEL E. BARKOW, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS 865, 866-68 (9th
ed. 2012) (discussing the "castle exception").
14. Tomlins, 107 N.E. at 497; see also People v. Lewis, 48 P. 1088, 1090 (Cal. 1897) ("When a
person is attacked in his own house, he need retreat no further." (quoting WHARTON ON CRIMINAL LAW
§ 502 (10th ed.))).
[Vol. 42:294
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ny (such as burglary, kidnapping, robbery, or rape) upon the person or
property of the defendant.'5
Third, in all jurisdictions, a successful claim of self-defense may be
advanced when the defender had reasonable grounds to believe that the at-
tacker was about to kill or seriously injure-whether or not that belief turns
out to be true. Thus, if the defender reasonably believed that the assailant
was holding a gun, or was pulling a gun from his or her coat, and respond-
ed to that perceived threat by killing the person, a claim of self-defense
would not be legally barred, although it turned out that the person killed did
not, in fact, have a deadly weapon or intend to kill or injure the defender. [n
both Retreat and No Retreat jurisdictions, the defender's belief in the need
to use deadly force must be honest and reasonable, but it need not be objec-
tively true.16
Fourth, in both Retreat and Stand Your Ground states, well-
established rules limit the availability of the self-defense justification.
Where the defendant is at fault in creating the situation which led to the ne-
cessity of using deadly force, or where the defendant was the "initial ag-
gressor" in the attack and did not withdraw from the encounter prior to us-
ing deadly force against an attacker, the defendant has no right to stand his
or her ground, and the defendant may not claim self-defense if the defend-
ant fails to retreat before using deadly force even to save the his or her own
life."
15. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 776.012 (2014) ("A person is justified in using or threatening to use
deadly force if he or she reasonably believes that using or threatening to use such force is necessary to
prevent . . . the imminent commission of a forcible felony."); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.15(2) (McKinney
2014) ("A person may not use deadly force upon another ... unless (a) The actor reasonably believes
that such other person is using or about to use deadly force . . . (b) He or she reasonably believes that
such other person is committing or attempting to commit a kidnapping, forcible rape, forcible criminal
sexual act or robbery .... ); Ragland v. State, 36 S.E. 682, 684 (Ga. 1900) ("A person in this State may
kill another for other purposes than to save his own life, and be justified, if he do so to prevent any felo-
ny from being committed on his habitation, person, or property . . . ."); Page v. State, 40 N.E. 745, 746
(Ind. 1894) ("[1]f the [retreat rule] applied to all cases ... it would require a man to flee before another
who murderously assails him, or a traveler to flee before a highway robber, or a woman to flee before
her would-be ravisher, before resorting to the extreme measure . . . . [Llaw puts upon a person no such
necessity.").
16. Thus, one night A is out for an evening stroll. Suddenly B jumps in front of him and demands
his wallet. A, who forgot his wallet at home, fears for his life as he sees B reach into his (B's) pocket and
begin pulling out a gun. A responds by drawing his own weapon and shooting B, killing him. It turns out
that B's weapon was a (realistic-looking) water pistol and was harmless. Under traditional self-defense
doctrine, A would successfully be able to claim self-defense on the ground that even though he was not
actually in grave danger of death or serious bodily injury from B, he reasonably believed that he was in
such danger.
17. What counts as "fault" is often far from clear. The Model Penal Code, for example, would de-
ny ajustification for using deadly force to a defendant who "with the purpose of causing death or serious
bodily harm, provoked the use of force against himself in the same encounter . . . ." MODEL PENAL
CODE § 3.04(2)(b)(i) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). Other courts appear to define "fault" more broadly,
denying the justification to defendants who were engaged in illegal activity at the time of the deadly
encounter. See, e.g., Mayes v. State, 744 N.E.2d 390, 392-95 (Ind. 2001), cited in KADISH ET AL.,supra
note 13, at 871 (upholding jury instruction to not find the defendant's use of deadly force justified if he
was "committing [or] escaping after the commission [of] a crime"); see also Boykin v. People, 45 P.
AM. J. CRIM. L.
Finally, the justification of self-defense is, primarily, a function of
necessity. The defense will be allowed only if the defender reasonably be-
lieved that the use of deadly force was an unavoidable means of saving the
defender (or another) from death or serious bodily injury." Ideally, the ele-
ment of necessity operates to balance the two important social policies ex-
pressed by the Retreat and No Retreat rules in self-defense law: the need, on
the one hand, to prevent violent self-help (and the possible chaos it might
produce); and, on the other hand, the perceived need to permit self-help in
cases where innocent life is endangered by an immediate threat and law en-
forcement is not present to defeat that threat.
B. Brief History of Stand and Retreat
Political critics appear to assume that Stand Your Ground laws are
new to the law of self-defense, the recent product of a fanatical nationwide
lobbying campaign by the National Rifle Association (NRA). 9 Not so. The
Duty to Retreat and the No Retreat (Stand Your Ground) approaches have
long co-existed in American legal doctrine,20 and both are historically root-
419, 422 (Colo. 1896) ("[l]t is the duty of the party assaulted to retreat to the wall ... where the parties
engage in mutual combat, or where the defendant is the assailant, and has not, in good faith, declined
further struggle before resorting to self-defense, or has provoked the assault with intent to commit a fel-
ony."); Page, 40 N.E. at 746 (holding that the right to resist force with force depends on the person be-
ing without fault, in a place where he had the right to be, and one "who invites or voluntarily enters the
conflict is not without fault. Retreat, in such case .. . becomes necessary"). As for what type of behavior
makes the defendant the "initial aggressor," the answer is also unclear. See infra text accompanying
notes 98-104.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 27-28.
19. See Tamara Rice Lave, Shoot to Kill: A Critical Look at Stand Your Ground Laws, 67 U.
MIAMI L. REv. 827, 836 (2013) (citations omitted) ("According to a wide variety of sources, the NRA
was instrumental in getting Stand Your Ground passed."); E.J. Dionne, Jr., Why the NRA Pushes 'Stand
Your Ground', WASH. POST (Apr. 15, 2012), www.washingtonpost.com/pb/opinions/why-the-nra-
pushes-stand-your-ground/2012/05/15/gIQAL458JT story.html (asserting that Stand Your Ground laws
arose because state legislatures and Congress were intimidated by the lobbying power of the NRA); Carl
Hiassen, Welcome to Florida, Where the NRA Rules and We Proudly Stand Our Ground, MIAMI
HERALD BLOG (Feb. 22, 2014, 7:00 PM), http://www.miamiherald.com/opinion/opn-columns-
blogs/carl-hiaasen/articlel960643.html (stating that the NRA "owns too many Republican lawmakers"
for Florida's Stand Your Ground law to be repealed); Andy Kroll, The Money Trail Behind Florida's
Notorious Gun Law, MOTHER JONES (Mar. 29, 2012, 6:00 AM),
http://motherjones.com/politics/2012/03/NRA-stand-your-ground-trayvon-martin ("The money trail
leading to the watershed law in Florida-the first of 24 across the nation-traces primarily to one
source: the National Rifle Association."); Samantha Lachman, The NRA is Directly Behind a Bill Loos-
ening Florida's 'Stand Your Ground' Law, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 25, 2014, 4:01 PM),
www.hufmingtonpost.com/2014/01/17/nra-guns-florida-n4619171.html (discussing a proposed bill,
written by a former NRA president and promoted by a "top NRA lobbyist," that would expand Florida's
Stand Your Ground law); Michael Ono, NRA Pushed for 'Stand Your Ground' Laws, ABC NEWS (Mar.
31, 2012, 4:33 PM), http:/abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2012/03/nra-pushed-for-stand-your-ground-
laws/ (stating that the NRA lobbied for the original Stand Your Ground law in Florida in 2004 and also
"lobbied to pass similar legislation in other states").
20. See Aya Gruber, Race to Incarcerate: Punitive Impulse and the Bid to Repeal Stand Your
Ground, 68 U. MIAMI L. REV. 961, 969 (2014) ("American jurists have debated for well over a century
the question of whether a person who reasonably fears imminent bodily injury and reasonably believes
defensive force is necessary must first attempt to retreat before using force.").
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ed in English common-law doctrine dating at least from the seventeenth
century.2'
In England, the justification of self-defense evolved as an exception
to the general rule, which prohibited persons from engaging in self-help that
costs human life.22 It is often said that English common law enforced a
strict duty of retreat, denying a self-defense claim unless the claimant could
prove the claimant's "back [was] to the wall" before responding to a deadly
attack by killing the aggressor.23 A quote from William Blackstone's Com-
mentaries captures the common view of early English law:
[T]he law requires that the person, who kills another in his own
defence, should have retreated as far he conveniently or safely
can, to avoid the violence of the assault, before he turns upon his
assailant; and that, not fictiously, or in order to watch his oppor-
tunity, but from a real tenderness of shedding his brother's blood.
And though it may be cowardice, in time of war between two in-
dependent nations, to flee from an enemy; yet between two fel-
low subjects the law countenances no such point of honor: Be-
cause the king and his courts are the vindices injuriarum
[avengers of injuries], and will give to the party wronged all the
satisfaction he deserves.2 4
But even early English commentators acknowledged exceptions to
the rule requiring retreat. Alongside the Retreat rule, the principle of "No
Retreat" (what we now call Stand Your Ground), though more limited in
scope than its American descendant, was an identified feature of English
law at least since the works of Sir Matthew Hale and Lord Edward Coke in
the seventeenth century, and both doctrines were a continuing thread in the
works of William Blackstone and Sir Michael Foster in the eighteenth cen-
tury and Edward Hyde East in the early nineteenth century.25 Their treatises
21. See, e.g., EDWARD COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWES OF ENGLAND
55-56 (1669) (noting that initial aggressors and mutual combatants had a duty to retreat before using
lethal force, but that no such duty existed where a person was defending his life or property).
22. See infra text accompanying note 25.
23. KADISH ET AL., supra note 13, at 865 ("[T]he English common law imposed a strict duty to re-
treat; a person could use deadly force in self-defense only after exhausting every chance to flee, when he
had his 'back to the wall."'). With respect to a non-deadly attack, the common law has always granted
the attacked person a right to stand his or her ground and respond with proportional (that is, non-deadly)
force. See infra note 25 and accompanying text.
24. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 184-85 (Oxford, Clar-
endon Press 1769).
25. See, e.g., BLACKSTONE, supra note 24, at 184-85 (finding no duty to retreat where attack "so
fierce" that attempt to retreat would endanger the person's life or put him in danger of "enormous bodily
harm"); COKE, supra note 21, at 56 (finding no duty to retreat when confronted by person with intent to
rob or murder); I EDWARD HYDE EAST ESQ., A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 220-21 (Lon-
don, A. Strahan 1803) (finding no duty to retreat from another who comes to commit a known felony
with force against his person, habitation, or property); SIR MICHAEL FOSTER, A REPORT OF SOME
PROCEEDINGS 273 (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1762) ("[An] injured party may repel force with force in
defense of his person, habitation, or property, against one who manifestly intends and endeavors with
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and commentaries all made clear that against the general backdrop of a Du-
ty to Retreat, the law in some situations would admit a claim of self-defense
when the defendant had failed to retreat, and instead stood his ground and
killed an attacker. 26 The balance between Retreat and No Retreat was cap-
tured in the doctrine of "necessity," a core element of self-defense from its
inception through to the present day. 27 The necessity rule permitted a claim
of self-defense to homicide only when killing the aggressor was unavoida-
ble-that is, only when the defendant reasonably believed that the use of
deadly force was the only means of saving life or limb.28
To be sure, English common-law doctrine strictly limited the cases
to which Stand Your Ground applied; not all situations in which a defend-
ant was ultimately faced with a "him or me" choice were considered valid
cases of self-defense. 29 Early English commentators distinguished between
two fundamental scenarios: (1) cases in which the defendant's use of deadly
force was justified-for example, where a blameless and law-abiding de-
fendant used deadly force to repel an attack from a thief or a burglar who
intended to kill or gravely injure him, and (2) cases in which the use of
deadly force was merely excused-for example where the defendant either
bore some responsibility for the deadly encounter, or had reasonably but in-
correctly believed that he or she was faced with imminent threat of death or
serious injury and responded with deadly force.30 In the former type of case,
a defendant could claim self-defense although he or she had stood his or her
ground and did not retreat; in the latter case, only defendants who could
prove that they attempted to retreat before using deadly force could success-
fully claim self-defense. Even then, defendants of the second type did not
merit a full acquittal but only an escape from execution, which was the usu-
al penalty for intentional killings by private citizens.3' Thus, under the Eng-
violence or surprise to commit a known felony upon either. In these cases he is not obligated to retreat . .
. ."); SIR MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 481 (Sollom Emlyn ed., E. & R.
Gosling 1736) (stating that a "true man" is not bound to retreat, but may kill his assailant, and it is not a
felony).
26. BLACKSTONE, supra note 24, at 184-85; COKE, supra note 21, at 56; EAST, supra note 25, at
220-21; FOSTER, supra note 25, at 273; HALE, supra note 25, at 481.
27. See United States v. Peterson, 483 F.2d 1222, 1229 (D.C. Cir. 1973) ("Self-defense, as a doc-
trine legally exonerating the taking of human life, is as viable now as it was in Blackstone's time....
But '[t]he law of self-defense is a law of necessity;' the right of self-defense arises only when the neces-
sity begins, and equally ends with the necessity . . . .") (quoting Holmes v. United States, 11 F.2d 569,
574 (1926))).
28. See 2 HENRY DE BRACTON, ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 340-41 (George
Woodbine ed., Belknap Press 1968) (defining homicide to include killings "[o]f necessity," and noting
that if the necessity was avoidable and "he could escape without slaying, he will then be guilty of homi-
cide; if unavoidable, since he kills without premeditated hatred but with sorrow of heart, in order to save
himself and his family, since he could not otherwise escape [danger], he is not liable to the penalty for
homicide").
29. FOSTER, supra note 25, at 273.
30. See EAST, supra note 25, at 220-22 (comparing excusable homicide by misadventure or
"chance-medley" to justified homicide).
3 1. See FOSTER, supra note 25, at 273 ("Self-defence.... It is either that sort of homicide, se et
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lish rule, as articulated by Edward Coke, a person was justified in using
deadly force against another, even to the point of killing the other, if threat-
ened with imminent death or grave injury for which the defendant bore no
responsibility or blame.32 In other cases where the defendant and the de-
ceased mutually came to blows and the embroglio reached the point where
the defendant found it necessary to kill the other rather than die, the defend-
ant could only claim self-defense if the defendant had first attempted to re-
treat; in other words, if the defendant's "back [was] to the wall" before us-
ing deadly force against the other person.33 Thus, in his 1628 treatise
Institutes of the Laws ofEngland, Lord Coke wrote:
Some be voluntary, yet being done upon inevitable cause, are no
felony. As if A be assaulted by B, and they fight together, and be-
fore any mortal blow be given, A giveth back [retreat] until he
cometh to a hedge, wall, or other strait, beyond which he can not
pass; and then, in his own defense and for safeguard of his own
life killeth the other; this is voluntary, and yet no felony . . .
Some, without giving back [retreating] to a wall, etc., or other in-
evitable cause, as if a thief offer to rob or murder B either abroad
or in his house, and thereupon assault him, and B defende him-
selfe without giving back, and in his defense killeth the thiefe,
this is no felony; for a man shall never give way to a thiefe, ect.,
neither shall he forfeit anything.35
Matthew Hale expressed a similar distinction in his famous History
of the Pleas of the Crown.36
The earliest American self-defense doctrine imposed a general Duty
of Retreat, but also admitted exceptions of the kind just described." In the
mid-to-late nineteenth century, however, the American approach changed as
homegrown legal commentators, 38 influential state supreme courts, and
United States Supreme Court opinions developed a more robust Stand Your
Ground doctrine, which became a widely adopted basis for self-defense in
sua defendendo, which is perfectly innocent and justifiable, or that which is in some measure blamable
and barely excusable .... [T]here are cases in which the man may, without retreating, oppose force to
force, even to the death.")
32. COKE, supra note 21, at 55-56.
33. See, e.g., Erwin v. State, 29 Ohio St. 186, 194-95 (Ohio 1876) (quoting COKE, supra note 21,
at 55-56) (discussing the distinction between homicide se defendendo and justifiable homicide).
34. In such cases the defendant would not be executed, but the defendant would instead forfeit his
property to the Crown. Id.
35. COKE, supra note 21, at 56.
36. See HALE, supra note 25, at 481 (contrasting general Duty to Retreat with circumstances
where it may not be necessary, e.g., the "true man" confronted by the thief).
37. RICHARD MAXWELL BROWN, NO DUTY TO RETREAT 5-7 (Oxford Univ. Press 1991).
38. See id. at 7 ("The first truly original American work on the criminal law was published in 1856
by Joel Prentiss Bishop of Massachusetts. . . . As for the law of homicide and self-defense, Bishop fol-
lowed Foster and East in the turn away from the duty to retreat.").
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this country.39 Perhaps the leading case was Erwin v. State in 1876.40 There
the Ohio Supreme Court held that the criminal law "will not permit the tak-
ing of [human life] to repel a mere trespass, . . . but a true man, who is
without fault, is not obliged to fly from an assailant, who, by violence or
surprise, maliciously seeks to take his life or do him enormous bodily
harm." 4 1 Some American courts may have read the phrase "true man" as
synonymous with "macho man"-implying that the Retreat rule mandated
cowardly behavior by requiring an attacked person to back away from a
fight.42 However, the Ohio court in Erwin simply pulled the phrase "true
man" from the seventeenth-century work of Matthew Hale.43 The plain lan-
39. See, e.g., Beard v. United States, 158 U.S. 550, 563-64 (1895) (holding instruction endorsing
duty to retreat erroneous; person in place he was entitled to be and who did not provoke the assault was
entitled to stand his ground and use force he honestly and reasonably believed necessary to save his life
or protect himself from great bodily harm); Erwin v. State, 29 Ohio St. 186, 194-99 (Ohio 1876) (trac-
ing development of the "retreating to the wall" doctrine in England and noting American divergence). In
Erwin, the court emphasized the American divergence by quoting the grand jury charge in leading case
of Commonwealth v. Selfridge, 2 Am. St. Trials 544 (1806), which stated that:
A man may repel force by force in defense of his person against any one
who manifestly intends, or endeavors by violence or surprise, feloniously to kill
him. And he is not obliged to retreat, but may pursue his adversary until he has
secured himself from all danger; and if he kill him in so doing, it is justifiable
self-defense . . . it must plainly appear by the circumstances of the case, as the
manner of the assault, the weapon, etc., that his life was in imminent danger, oth-
erwise the killing of the assailant will not be justflable homicide. But if the party
killing had reasonable grounds for believing that the person slain had a felonious
design against him, although it should afterward appear that there was no such de-
sign, it will not be murder, but will be either manslaughter or excusable homicide,
according to the degree of caution and the probable grounds for such belief.
40. 29 Ohio St. 186 (Ohio 1876). In Erwin, the Ohio Supreme Court described the evolution of
self-defense law in the United States, making clear that "under our constitution, whether the killing in
self-defense be justifiable or excusable, there must be an entire acquittal, for the reason that there is no
forfeiture of goods in case of excusable homicide." Id. at 199. Thus, in the United States, self-defense as
a justification came to include not only cases in which the defendant used deadly force because the de-
fendant correctly believed that the defendant was faced with the imminent threat of death or serious bod-
ily injury, but it also includes cases in which the defendant honestly and reasonably, but incorrectly,
believed that the defendant was faced with such a threat. See, e.g., United States v. Peterson, 483 F.2d
1222, 1230 (D.C. Cir. 1973) ("The defender must have believed that he was in imminent peril of death
or serious bodily harm, and that the response was necessary to save himself therefrom. These beliefs
must not only have been honestly entertained, but also objectively reasonable in light of the surrounding
circumstances.").
41. Erwin, 29 Ohio St. at 199.
42. See, e.g., State v. Abbott, 174 A.2d 881, 884 (N.J. 1961) ("[A]dvocates of no-retreat say the
manly thing is to hold one's ground, and hence society should not demand what smacks of cowardice.");
BROWN, supra note 37, at 17 ("The language of the supreme court in Ohio [in Erwin] with its emphasis
on the action of a 'true man' and of the Indiana Court [in Runyan, infra] with its repudiation of what it
saw as legalized cowardice illustrates . . . concern for the values of masculine bravery in a frontier na-
tion.").
43. Erwin, 29 Ohio St. at 194; see also Garrett Epps, The History of Florida's 'Stand Your
Ground' Law, AMERICAN PROSPECT (Mar. 21, 2012), http://prospect.org/article/history-floridas-stand-
your-ground-law ("[A] 'true man' in the legal sense-mean[s] not a manly man but, in the words of the
Oxford English Dictionary, 'an honest man (as distinguished from a thief or other criminal)."'); BROWN,
supra note 37, at 9 (recounting the Ohio Supreme Court opinion in Erwin and reporting that the court in
that case "found that Erwin himself had been without blame and therefore as a 'true man' was 'not
obliged to fly' from his assailant"). Brown argues that the Erwin court "widened" Hale's "true man"
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guage of the Erwin court's ruling suggests the phrase was meant not to ap-
plaud machismo, but to distinguish the blameworthy from the innocent.'
Thus, in the self-defense context the phrase "true man" simply referred to
an honest person, lawfully going about his business, who finds himself
faced with a sudden, deadly, unlawful, and unprovoked attack from another
who means to kill him or do him serious bodily harm.45 Such persons, the
Erwin court held, may claim self-defense if, to save their own lives, they
kill the attacker without first attempting to retreat.4 6
Importantly, in Erwin the Ohio Supreme Court explicitly couched
the No Retreat doctrine within the framework of necessity-the principle
that a self-defense claim is permitted only when the defendant reasonably
believes that killing an aggressor was the only available means of prevent-
ing a deadly attack:
[A]ll authorities agree that the taking of life in defense of one's
person can not be either justified or excused, except on the
ground of necessity; and that such necessity must be imminent at
the time; and they also agree that no man can avail himself of
such necessity if he brings it upon himself. The question, then, is
simply this: Does the law hold a man who is violently and feloni-
ously assaulted responsible for having brought such necessity up-
on himself, on the sole ground that he failed to fly from his as-
sailant when he might have safely done so? [No.] . . . [A] true
man, who is without fault, is not obliged to fly from an assailant,
who, by violence or surprise, maliciously seeks to take his life or
do him enormous bodily harm. 47
doctrine, an argument apparently premised on the claim that Hale had meant the doctrine to cover only
the situation in which an honest man was assaulted by a thief, whereas the Erwin court treated the thief
situation as exemplary of a more general rule supporting a Stand Your Ground approach whenever an
honest person is attacked, without lawful provocation, by "an assailant who, by violence or surprise,
maliciously seeks to take his life or do him enormous bodily harm." Id. Hale's language appears suscep-
tible to either interpretation, and either will suffice for purposes of this essay, the point here being only
to show that the No Retreat principle has longstanding roots in both English and American legal doc-
tnine.
44. Erwin, 29 Ohio St. at 199.
45. See Epps, supra note 43 (noting that the "true man" doctrine in English self-defense law was
"not a manly man but, in the words of the Oxford English Dictionary, 'an honest man (as distinguished
from a thief or other criminal).").
46. Id at 199-200. In her article The True Woman: Scenes from the Law of Self-Defense, 31
HARV. J. L. & GENDER 237 (2008), Jeannie Suk discusses a number of historical interpretations of the
phrase "true man," including its interpretation to mean simply "an honest and good man." See id. at 244
("The most literal [interpretation of the phrase] was the idea of a man who was 'true' in the sense of
honest, and who made decisions based on what he believed was true."); see also People v. News-Times
Pub. Co., 84 P. 912, 957 (Colo. 1906) (Steele, J., dissenting) ("[S]hould I do what any true man ought to
do, firmly believing that he spoke the truth, say, that he had spoken the truth and offer to establish the
verity of the articles?"); Springfield Republican, A Singular Case, N.Y. DAILY TIMES, June 16, 1852, at
4 ("Dr. DeWolf deserves much credit, not for being honest, for a true man could hardly be otherwise,
but . . . for delivering to justice, an offender against the laws.").
47. Erwin, 29 Ohio St. at 199-200.
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At the normative level, the Erwin court explained its rejection of
the Duty to Retreat not on the basis of discouraging cowardice, but on the
basis that the Stand Your Ground rule was "best calculated to protect and
preserve human life."4 8
A year after Erwin, the Supreme Court of Indiana also embraced
the No Retreat approach. In Runyan v. State,49 the defendant had shot and
killed the deceased."o Operating under instructions that strongly endorsed
the Retreat rule, a jury convicted Runyan of manslaughter.s' In relevant
part, those jury instructions stated:
The law gives to every man the right of self-defence. . . . He may
repel force by force, and he may resort to such force as, under the
circumstances surrounding him, may reasonably seem necessary
to repel the attack upon him, and, in his defence, he may even go
to the extent of taking the life of his assailant. The law, however,
is tender of human life, and will not suffer the life even of an as-
sailant and wrong-doer to be taken, unless the assault is of such a
character as to make it appear reasonably necessary to the as-
sailed to take life in defence of his own life, or to protect his per-
son from great bodily harm. And if the person assailed can pro-
tect his life and his person by retreating, it is his duty to retreat,
and thus avoid the necessity of taking human life.52
Citing prominent authority to the effect that the Stand Your Ground
approach "is founded on the law of nature; and is not, nor can be, supersed-
ed by any law of society,"5 3 the Indiana Supreme Court rejected the lower
court's Retreat instruction, explaining that the American law of self-defense
had embraced its opposite:
A very brief examination of the American authorities makes it
evident that the ancient doctrine, as to the duty of a person as-
sailed to retreat as far as he can, before he is justified in repelling
force by force, has been greatly modified in this country, and has
with us a much narrower application than formerly. Indeed, the
tendency of the American mind seems to be very strongly against
the enforcement of any rule which requires a person to flee when
assailed, to avoid chastisement or even to save human life, and
that tendency is well illustrated by the recent decisions of our
48. Id.
49. 57 Ind. 80 (Ind. 1877).
50. Id. at 81.
51. Id. at 82.
52. Id. The trial court instruction also made clear that retreat is not always necessary before the
person attacked may take the life of the attacker: "If the assault is of such character that it reasonably
appears to the party assaulted that retreat cannot be made so as to protect his life, or his person from
great bodily harm, then retreat is not required." Id. at 82-83 (internal quotation marks omitted).
53. Id. at 84.
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courts, bearing on the general subject of the right of self-
defence. 54
The Runyan court concluded: "[W]hen a person, being without fault and in
a place where he has a right to be, is violently assaulted, he may, without
retreating, repel force by force, and if, in reasonable exercise of his right of
self-defence, his assailant is killed, he is justifiable.""
Other state court cases in the late 1 800s echoed support for the No
Retreat approach, reaffirming that a person may use deadly force against
another without first attempting to retreat if: (1) the person is in a place
where the person has the lawful right to be; (2) the person is the victim of a
deadly and unprovoked attack from which (3) the person honestly and rea-
sonably fears death, grave bodily injury, or commission of a serious felony;
and (4) the person reasonably believes that using deadly force to repel the
attack is the only available means of forestalling such injurious conse-
quences.56
At the close of the nineteenth century, the United States Supreme
Court joined the conversation. In the 1895 case Beard v. United States, 7 the
Court embraced the No Retreat approach, holding that a defendant who was
"where he had a right to be" when attacked, who "did not provoke the as-
sault," and who reasonably and in good faith believed "that the deceased
intended to take his life or do him great bodily harm," was not obligated to
retreat, "nor to consider whether he could safely retreat, but was entitled to
stand his ground. . . .""
54. Id. The court relied on several treatises including 2 WHARTON ON CRIM[NAL LAW § 1019
(1846) as follows: "A man may repel force by force in the defense of his person, habitation, or property,
against one or many who manifestly intend and endeavor, by violence or surprise, to commit a known
felony on either. In such a case he is not obliged to retreat . . .
55. Runyan, 57 Ind. at 84.
56. See, e.g., People v. Lewis, 48 P. 1088, 1089-90 (Cal. 1897) (citing Runyan v. State, 57 Ind. 80
(Ind. 1877), Beard v. United States, 158 U.S. 550 (1895) and Erwin v. State, 29 Ohio St. 186 (Ohio
1876), for the proposition that the law affirms the right ofan innocent person to stand his ground and use
deadly force to defend himself against an assailant who intends to kill or gravely injure him); Boykin v.
People, 45 P. 419, 422 (Colo. 1896) ("[A] defendant [is not obliged to retreat when he] is where he has a
right to be . . . honestly and in good faith believes, and the circumstances being such as would induce a
like belief in a reasonable man, that he is about to receive at the hands of his assailant great bodily harm,
or to lose his life, . . . ."); Page v. State, 40 N.E. 745, 746 (Ind. 1894) ("[Wlhere an attack is made with
murderous intent . . . the person attacked is under no duty to flee; he may stand his ground, and if need
be kill his adversary."); State v. Hatch, 46 P. 708, 708 (Kan. 1896) ("The doctrine that a party unlawful-
ly attacked must 'retreat to the wall' before he can be justified in taking the life of his assailant in self-
defense does not obtain in this State.") (citation omitted). Courts have sometimes opined that the Retreat
rule is implied by the doctrinal requirement, in self-defense law generally, that the killing of the de-
ceased have been "necessary" to save the defender from death or serious physical injury. E.g., United
States v. Peterson, 483 F.2d 1222, 1229-30 (D.C. Cir. 1973). But if common-law precedent is the mark-
er, even this proposition appears to be in doubt. See, e.g., Ragland v. State, 36 S.E. 682, 684 (Ga. 1900)
("[A] defense [claim] is complete when to a jury it appears that the circumstances were sufficient to ex-
cite the fears of a reasonable man that a felony was about to be committed, and that he killed to prevent
its commission.").
57. 158 U.S. 550.
58. Id at 564.
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Twenty-six years later, in Brown v. United States," Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes added normative ballast to the Beard Court's embrace of
Stand Your Ground. In Brown, Justice Holmes famously opined for the
Court that the No Retreat rule was more just, because it was more con-
sistent with human nature than its reverse:
The law has grown, and even if historical mistakes have contrib-
uted to its growth it has tended in the direction of rules consistent
with human nature. Many respectable writers agree that if a man
reasonably believes that he is in immediate danger of death or
grievous bodily harm from his assailant he may stand his ground
and that if he kills him he has not exceeded the bounds of lawful
self-defense. That has been the decision of this Court [citing
Beard]. Detached reflection cannot be demanded in the presence
of an uplifted knife. Therefore in this Court, at least, it is not a
condition of immunity that one in that situation should pause to
consider whether a reasonable man might not think it possible to
fly with safety or to disable his assailant rather than to kill him.60
For Justice Holmes, Stand Your Ground was the right approach not just
because it had in fact become widely accepted by many states, but also be-
cause it more accurately reflected the behavior and the capacities of human
beings under the stress of imminent attack and possible death.61
C. The Normative Roots of Stand Your Ground
In sum, the debate between Stand Your Ground and Retreat has
longstanding historical roots in the common law of England. Both princi-
ples crossed the ocean centuries ago, and both continue to appear in the
self-defense doctrine of the American states and in relevant interpretations
of the United States Supreme Court.
Of course, the fact that a legal rule has existed for a long time does
not make it right. Is the No Retreat approach morally defensible? We can
begin to answer that question by examining the normative rationales, which
drove the expansion of Stand Your Ground in the nineteenth-century United
States.
First, courts embraced Stand Your Ground on the basis that it saves
lives. Recall that the Ohio Supreme Court explicitly affirmed this rationale
in Erwin, when it stated that the No Retreat rule is "the surest [way] to pre-
59. 256 U.S. 335 (1921).
60. Id. at 343 (emphasis added). Justice Holmes acknowledged that a defendant's failure to retreat
"is a circumstance to be considered with all the others in order to determine whether the defendant went
farther than he was justified in doing . . . ." Id. This statement appears to assess a defendant's decision to
retreat or not against an overall necessity standard. See infra Part V.D. (arguing that the necessity stand-
ard can effectively adjudicate the Retreat and No Retreat issue).
6 1. Id.
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vent the occurrence of occasions for taking life; and this, by letting the
would-be robber, murderer, ravisher, and such like, know that their lives
are, in a measure, in the hands of their intended victims."6 2 The court de-
clared that Stand Your Ground saves lives by deterring would-be aggres-
sors.63 Such aggressors will be discouraged from attacking innocent victims
by the knowledge that, if they do launch a deadly and unprovoked assault,
their intended victim will be justified in responding with deadly force even
to the point of killing them." Thus, Stand Your Ground saves more inno-
cent lives than does the Retreat rule.
A second rationale, the basis for Justice Holmes's embrace of Stand
Your Ground in Brown, rejects the Retreat rule on the basis that it unjustly
burdens innocent defenders by requiring them, while facing imminent death
or serious injury, to consider and assess their chances of safely retreating
before fighting force with force. Justice Holmes's declaration in Brown that
"[d]etached reflection cannot be demanded in the presence of an uplifted
knife"66 suggests that imposing a legal Duty to Retreat is unjust because it
is based on unrealistic assumptions about the human capacity for rational
deliberation under severe emotional stress.
This rationale may find contemporary support in the advances of
neuroscience, suggesting that (1) the limbic system of the brain, which con-
trols basic emotions including fear and anger, can overwhelm the rational
faculties in times of great stress, and (2) such emotional flooding may drive
an individual's decisions in ways of which even the individual is unaware.6 7
In a 1987 newspaper article assailing the law's "reasonable man" standard
in another self-defense context,68 neuropsychiatrist Richard Restak seemed
62. Erwin v. State, 29 Ohio St. 186, 200 (Ohio 1876).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. 256 U.S. 335 (1921).
66. 256 U.S. at 343.
67. Kenneth W. Simons, Self-Defense: Reasonable Beliefs or Reasonable Self-Control?, 11 NEW
CRIM. L. REV. 51, 77-79 (2008). Simons summarizes relevant work by Neuroscientist Joseph LeDoux of
New York University, involving the brain's response to emotional stimuli: "[F]rightening stimuli were
processed by the emotional part of the brain before they were processed by the cortex, the seat of con-
scious thought.... As a result, we experience strong emotional reactions before knowing what, exactly,
we are reacting to." Id. Simons concludes, "[i]n the fast-moving context of a violent attack, it is often
unrealistic to expect the person attacked to consciously and carefully evaluate the precise extent of a
threat, the likely effect of [a defender's] response on the aggressor, and the availability of alternatives."
Id. He writes that "[a person's] emotional and intuitive reactions will often display a 'wisdom' of their
own," but also that spontaneous reactions to sudden threats "are sometimes crude, resulting in inaccurate
or excessive responses to threats." Id; see also AARON T. BECK, PRISONERS OF HATE: THE COGNITIVE
BASIS OF ANGER, HOSTILITY, AND VIOLENCE 73 (2000) (noting that "primal thinking processes" are
adaptive in emergencies but may also "crowd[] out our more reflective thinking"); see generally Joseph
E. LeDoux, The Emotional Brain, Fear, and the Amygdala, 23 CELLULAR & MOLECULAR
NEUROBIOLOGY 727 (2003) (explaining the role of the amygdala in the expression of fear, in the con-
scious awareness of it, and in its cognitive processing).
68. The case involved Bernhard Goetz, the 1984 New York City "subway vigilante." KADISH ET
AL., supra note 13, at 828-29.
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to place the imprimatur of neuroscience on Justice Holmes's intuition:
On the basis of what I know about the human brain I'm con-
vinced that there are no reasonable people under conditions in
which death or severe bodily harm are believed imminent ....
Although lawyers and judges love to explore [the issue of wheth-
er or not a threatened person acted "reasonably" in a particular
situation, such ex post legal analysis places] an overemphasis on
empty intellectualization to the exclusion of those deep and pow-
erful emotional currents of fear, self-preservation or territoriality
that can surface in any one of us and overpower the cogitations of
reason . . . . To expect reasonable behavior in the face of per-
ceived threat, terror and rage is itself a most unreasonable expec-
tation. 69
Dr. Restak was speaking of the "reasonable person" standard in self-
defense generally, not specifically of the Duty to Retreat, but the passage
invites a close analogy: To the extent that the Duty to Retreat requires the
innocent defender to deliberate-about the defender's response options
generally, about the probable behavior of the attacker, or the statistical
chances of making a safe retreat-in a situation in which humans are gener-
ally unable to think clearly, the rule may be unjust to those innocent de-
fenders who use deadly force without first trying to escape. The Retreat rule
may be unjust in the same sense that requiring a defender to sprout wings
and fly away from the attacker would be unjust.
Third, some modem courts have embraced the No Retreat approach
on grounds of clarity and fairness. For example, in the Nevada case of Cul-
verson v. State,70 the defendant, Culverson, appealed his first-degree murder
conviction on the grounds that the trial court had improperly instructed the
jury that he had a duty to retreat before using deadly force against the de-
ceased." Reversing the defendant's conviction, the Supreme Court of Ne-
vada unequivocally affirmed a 90-year-old precedent, State v. Grimmett,72
which had embraced Stand Your Ground. 73 The Culverson court explained:
[Defendant] Culverson contends that Grimmett stands for the
proposition that Nevada does not require a person to retreat when
69. Richard Restak, The Law: The Fiction of the "Reasonable Man", WASH. POST, May 17, 1987,
at C3; see also Simons, supra note 67, at 64 ("Indeed, it will often be a self-defeating strategy for an
actor who is suddenly attacked to pause and carefully examine his options; the very effort to form accu-
rate, or indeed any, beliefs might increase his risk of injury or decrease the efficacy of his planned re-
sponse."). Simons also cites BECK, supra note 67, which states: "When we are confronted with a threat,
we have to be able to label the circumstances quickly so that an appropriate strategy (fight or flight) can
be put into effect. The thought processes activated by threats compress complex information into a sim-
plified, unambiguous category as rapidly as possible." Id at 78 n.48.
70. Culverson v. State, 797 P.2d 238 (Nev. 1990).
71. Id at 239.
72. State v. Grimmett, 112 P. 273 (Nev. 1910).
73. Culverson, 797 P.2d at 240 (citing Grimmett, 112 P. at 273).
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he reasonably believes that he is about to be attacked with deadly
force. We agree. First, we note that a rule requiring a non-
aggressor to retreat confers a benefit on the aggressor and a det-
riment on the non-aggressor. Second, it is often quite difficult for
a jury to determine whether a person should reasonably believe
that he may retreat from a violent attack in complete safety.
Thus, a rule which requires a non-aggressor to retreat may con-
fuse the jury and lead to inconsistent verdicts. We believe that a
simpler rule will lead to more just verdicts.7 4
Under the Culverson court's rationale, a Stand Your Ground rule
increases clarity because it obviates the need for the jury to inquire into the
often-unanswerable question of whether a defender actually knew of a re-
treat option and knew that it was completely safe. Under Culverson, the
Stand Your Ground approach is also fairer to innocent defenders than the
Retreat rule. A duty of retreat forces an innocent defender, in the moment of
being attacked, to assess his options for escape and to act on those options if
possible, before responding with deadly force. Such a duty, the court sug-
gests, favors the life of an unlawful aggressor over that of an innocent de-
fender. The court's statement in Culverson, that "a rule requiring a non-
aggressor to retreat confers a benefit on the aggressor and a detriment on
the non-aggressor"" implies that if forced to choose between the life of an
innocent person and the life of an unlawful aggressor, the law should side
with the former and not the latter.
It is possible to dispute or disagree with the above arguments in fa-
vor of Stand Your Ground. What seems clear is that those arguments are
neither obviously irrational nor morally repulsive. On the contrary, all four
lines of reasoning proceed from basic moral intuitions that we recognize,
even today, to be generally pro-social and central to the law's mission in
particular-intuitions supporting the law's obligation to protect innocent
human life, to refrain from imposing superhuman duties on law-abiding cit-
izens, and to structure legal doctrine so that factfinders have the best possi-
ble chance at accurately deciding difficult fact issues, such as what a de-
fendant knew or consciously intended at the time of a potentially criminal
act.
III. What's Wrong With Stand Your Ground?
Why then, is Stand Your Ground so controversial at the moment?
The controversy seems to stem from two sources: (1) confusion about the
elements of self-defense law generally, and about the role and function of
Retreat and Stand Your Ground rules in particular; and (2) politically sali-
ent claims that Stand Your Ground laws are socially unjust, or that they
74. Id
75. Id.
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promote and increase gun violence, or both. This Part examines the doctri-
nal confusions, and Part IV assesses the affirmative charges of racism and
violence.
A. Confusion about the Elements of Self-Defense
Although Retreat and Stand Your Ground rules have long common-
law histories in the United States, the twenty-first century has introduced an
era of statutory reforms that embrace Stand Your Ground legislatively.
Since 2005, when the Florida legislature replaced the state's Retreat rule
with a Stand Your Ground statute, about half the states have followed suit."6
In important respects, Stand Your Ground statutes typically mirror com-
mon-law No Retreat rules, providing that: (1) a person has no duty to re-
treat if the person is not the initial aggressor and is assailed in any public
place (not merely at home) where the person has a right to be;n and (2) a
person is presumed to have a reasonable fear of imminent death or serious
bodily harm in cases where the person confronts an intruder who has en-
tered or is attempting to enter the person's home." The second point clari-
76. 'STAND YOUR GROUND'SUMMARY, supra note 1. Approximately 26 states have adopted statuto-
ry Stand Your Ground laws since 2005. Id The original version of the Florida Stand Your Ground stat-
ute became the national model. FLA. STAT. § 776.013(3) (2006):
A person who is not engaged in an unlawful activity and who is attacked in
any place where he or she has a right to be has no duty to retreat and has the right
to stand his or her ground and meet force with force, including deadly force if he
reasonably believes it is necessary to do so to prevent death or great bodily harm
to himself or to prevent the commission of a forcible felony.
In Florida, the Stand Your Ground statute replaced the state's Retreat rule, which imposed a duty
to retreat if it was possible to do so safely. FLA. STAT. § 776.012 (2004). In Baker v. State, the Florida
Court of Appeals interpreted the old Retreat rule to mean that the "one interposing the defense must
have used all reasonable means in his power, consistent with his own safety, to avoid the danger and to
avert the necessity of taking human life." Baker v. State, 506 So. 2d 1056, 1058 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1987), superseded by statute, FLA. STAT. § 776.013 (2006).
77. E.g., FLA. STAT. § 776.012(2) (2014). Similarly, the statutory Stand Your Ground rules in
Michigan provide:
(1) An individual who has not or is not engaged in the commission of a crime at
the time he or she uses deadly force may use deadly force against another individ-
ual anywhere he or she has the legal right to be with no duty to retreat if either of
the following applies:
(a) The individual honestly and reasonably believes that the use of deadly force is
necessary to prevent the imminent death of or imminent great bodily harm to him-
self or herself or to another individual.
(b) The individual honestly and reasonably believes that the use of deadly force is
necessary to prevent the imminent sexual assault of himself or herself or of anoth-
er individual.
MICl. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 780.972(2) (West 2014).
78. E.g., FLA. STAT. § 776.013(1) (2014) ("[A] person is presumed to have held a reasonable fear.
if [the person against who the defensive force was used . . . unlawfully and forcefully entered, a
dwelling, residence, or occupied vehicle . . [and the defendant] knew or had reason to believe . . . [the
event] had occurred.").
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fies the Castle Doctrine.7 9 Most of the controversy over Stand Your Ground
rules, therefore, concerns the first principle, which establishes a person's
right to stand and fight, even if retreat is possible, when faced with immi-
nent and deadly force from an aggressor outside the defendant's home.
This issue exploded onto the national scene in February and March
2012, after George Zimmerman shot and killed 17-year-old Trayvon Martin
in Sanford, Florida. From the start, Zimmerman claimed that he had acted
in self-defense, and the Sanford police initially accepted that account."
Calls by Martin's family for further investigation prompted a media fire-
storm around the case, which ultimately resulted in second-degree murder
and manslaughter charges against Zimmerman."' The case went to trial in
the summer of 2013, and in July of that year, the trial jury acquitted Zim-
merman of all charges.8 2
As noted above," it is not clear that any legal issue in the Zimmer-
man case turned on the presence of Florida's Stand Your Ground statute.
Zimmerman chose not to ask for a pre-trial Stand Your Ground hearing, and
at trial he advanced a straightforward self-defense claim.84 A number of
media stories pointed both to the presence of Stand Your Ground language
in the jury instructions" and to the post-trial comments of one juror alleging
that the jury discussed Stand Your Ground during deliberations.86 But the
particular juror's remarks about Stand Your Ground failed to establish ei-
ther the juror's understanding of the state's No Retreat rule or how that rule
differs from other, arguably more relevant, elements of self-defense. Thus,
the effect on the Zimmerman jury of the Stand Your Ground language in
79. See generally Catherine L. Carpenter, Of the Enemy Within, the Castle Doctrine, and Self-
Defense, 86 MARQ. L. REV. 653, 655-57 (2003) (noting that the Castle Doctrine exists in some Retreat
jurisdictions as an exception to the general rule).
80. Eliot C. McLaughlin, Ex-Sanford Police Chief Zimmerman Probe 'Taken Away from Us',
CNN (July 11, 2013, 12:03 PM), www.cnn.com/2013/07/10/justice/sanford-bill-lee-exclusive/.
81. Sari Horwitz, George Zimmerman Charged with Second-Degree Murder in Trayvon Martin
Shooting, WASH. POST (Apr. 11, 2012), www.washingtonpost.com/politics/george-zimmerman-to-be-
charged-in-trayvon-martin-shooting-law-enforccment-official- says/2012/04/11 /glQAHJ5oAT story.htm.
82. Lizette Alvarez & Cara Buckley, Zimmerman is Acquitted in Trayvon Martin Killing,
N.Y.TIMES (July 13, 2013), www.nytimes.com/2013/07/14/us/george-zimmerman-verdict-trayvon-
martin.html.
83. Supra text accompanying notes 3-5.
84. Yamiche Alcindor, Zimmerman waives pre-trial immunity hearing, USA TODAY (Apr. 10,
2013, 4:11 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/04/30/trayvon-martin-zimmerman-
self-defense-hearing/2122991/.
85. E.g., Mark Memmott, Read: Instructions for the Jury in the Trial of George Zimmerman, NPR
(July 12, 2013, 7:10 AM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2013/07/12/201410108/read-
instructions-for-the-jury-in-trial-of-george-zimmerman ("If George Zimmerman was not engaged in an
unlawful activity . . . he had the right to stand his ground and meet force with force . .. if he reasonably
believed that it was necessary to do so to prevent death or great bodily harm to himself.").
86. E.g., Mark Caputo, Juror: We Talked Stand Your Ground Before Not-Guilty Zimmerman Ver-
dict, MIAMI HERALD (July 16, 2013), http://www.miamiherald.com/2013/07/16/3502481/juror-we-
talked-stand-your-ground.html ("Jurors discussed Florida's controversial Stand Your Ground self-
defense law before rendering their not-guilty verdict in George Zimmerman's trial, one of the jurors told
CNN's Anderson Cooper.").
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the instructions remains unclear."
Further, judging by the facts presented at trial, the encounter be-
tween Zimmerman and Martin did not even raise a genuine issue of Stand
Your Ground. George Zimmerman argued (and the jury apparently be-
lieved) that Zimmerman shot Trayvon Martin out of fear for his life when
Martin was on top of him, beating on him and slamming his head into a
concrete sidewalk." If these facts are true, then regardless of what the law
or the jury instructions said, Zimmerman had no opportunity to retreat-no
choice but to stay where he was and defend himself. Even in Retreat juris-
dictions, a defender has the duty to retreat only when retreat is reasonably
possible.89 If a safe retreat is not possible, and the other elements of self-
defense are present, a defendant may stand his or her ground and respond
with force, including deadly force, if the defendant reasonably fears for his
or her life.90
Critics of the Zimmerman verdict may contest the defendant's ver-
sion of the facts, but if that is their problem with the case, their complaint is
really about the weakness of the prosecution's proof and performance in
front of the jury, not about Florida's Stand Your Ground rule.9 1 Proving its
version of the facts beyond a reasonable doubt is, of course, the job of the
prosecution seeking a conviction in every criminal case-not just those in-
volving self-defense.
As this example from the Zimmerman case suggests, one important
problem with the political opposition to Stand Your Ground is that it some-
times gets the law wrong. The next section considers a few other relevant
confusions about Stand Your Ground rules in the context of the law of self-
defense.
B. What Does the Law of Self-Defense Actually Say?
Some misinformed arguments about Stand Your Ground laws are
premised on confusion about how and when such rules allow a person to act
when threatened with deadly force. Consider, for example, the related is-
sues of trigger and timing: What triggers a defender's right to use deadly
force against a deadly attack, and at what point in a deadly encounter does
87. Id. (."The law became very confusing. It became very confusing,' [the juror] told Cooper
Monday night. 'We had stuff thrown at us. We had the second-degree murder charge, the manslaughter,
charge, then we had self defense, Stand Your Ground."'); see also GRUBER, supra note 20, at 977 ("[l]t
appears that the [Zimmerman] jurors neither distinguished stand your ground from class self-defense nor
actually thought Zimmerman could have retreated.").
88. Lizette Alvarez, In Zimmerman Case, Self-Defense Was Hard to Topple, NY TIMES (July 14,
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/15/us/in-zimmerman-case-sclf-defense-was-hard-to-topple.html.
89. E.g., State v. Golwacki, 630 N.W.2d 392, 399 (Minn. 2001) ("[G]enerally, the law mandates a
duty to retreat if reasonably possible when acting in self-defense.").
90. Beard v. United States, 158 U.S. 550, 564 (1895).
91. A complaint many shared. E.g., ALVAREZ, supra note 82 ("Legal experts pointed to what they
said were errors by the prosecution."). The article goes on to describe a number of problems with the
prosecution's case and its performance at trial.
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that right "kick in"? In the wake of the Zimmerman verdict, some protests
against Stand Your Ground were apparently motivated by the belief that No
Retreat statutes, such as Florida's, allow a person to kill anyone who makes
him or her feel threatened, and at any point after the person subjectively ex-
periences that feeling. 92
But that is just not so. The plain language of Florida's Stand Your
Ground provision (which, again, became the model for similar provisions
across the country) explains why. The statute provides that a person who is
not engaged in an unlawful activity and is attacked in any place where the
person has a right to be, has no duty to retreat and has the right to stand his
or her ground and meet force with force, including deadly force, if the per-
son reasonably believes it is necessary to prevent death or great bodily harm
or to prevent the commission of a forcible felony.9 3
The statute's language makes two things abundantly clear: (1) What
triggers a defender's right to use deadly force is the prior, uninvited and un-
lawful threat of deadly force by another; and (2) the defender's right to use
deadly force arises as of that moment-the moment when the defender fac-
es a deadly threat from the other person. That is what the statute clearly
says and that is what courts have consistently held at common-law and in
decisions interpreting self-defense statutes. 94 A person's right to self-
defense begins at the moment the person reasonably believes that he or she
is facing deadly force and reasonably believes it necessary to respond in
kind.
Thus, George Zimmerman could not have successfully argued self-
defense had he shot Martin at any point before Martin posed a deadly threat
to him. Only at the moment when Zimmerman subjectively and reasonably
believed that Martin was going to kill or seriously injure him, was he justi-
fied in using deadly force. Whether Zimmerman did in fact believe that
Martin threatened him in this way was a question of fact to be adjudicated
at trial. Zimmerman's acquittal suggests he persuaded the jury that he met
92. See Leider, supra note 5 ("Many have asserted that in Florida anyone who believes he is in
danger can use deadly force, no matter how unreasonable his belief. These perceptions of the law are
wrong."); see also Obama's Address, supra note 7 and accompanying text (quoting from President
Obama's remarks, in July 2013, about the Stand Your Ground controversy). "Trayvon's Law," a statute
some Stand Your Ground opponents have proposed to reform Florida's law of self-defense, seems to
reflect a similar concern. Trayvon s Law: Bill Summary, NAACP, http://www.naacp.org/pages/trayvons-
law-summary (last visited Mar. 4, 2015) ("An aggressor who pursues an individual(s) without justifiable
cause must not automatically be protected under the law, if they shoot or harm their target(s). They must
prove they were acting in self-defense and had a rational and reasonable purpose in using force or dead-
ly force."). Except in the sense that all defendants are innocent until proven guilty, self-defense law has
never "automatically" protected initial aggressors who shoot or harm their adversaries.
93. FLA. STAT. § 776.012(2) (2014).
94. E.g., State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8, 13 (N.C. 1989) (citation omitted) ("Only [where a de-
fendant] killed due to a reasonable belief that death or great bodily harm was imminent can the justifica-
tion for homicide remain clearly and firmly rooted in necessity. . . . The term 'imminent,' as used to de-
scribe such perceived threats . . . has been defined as 'immediate danger. ); supra text
accompanying note 27-28 (discussing the centrality of necessity to self-defense).
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these requirements.
If this is correct, it exposes another doctrinal confusion about self-
defense law and Stand Your Ground. Expanding our view to look at the en-
tire encounter between Zimmerman and Martin, from the moment when
Zimmerman first saw Martin, it appears true that Zimmerman "made the
first move" in the sense that when Zimmerman first spotted Martin walking
through the Twin Lakes neighborhood, he chose to follow the teenager.
Further, Zimmerman's choice to follow Martin was surely a "but for" cause
of Martin's death: But for Zimmerman's pursuit of Martin, the shooting of
Martin would not have occurred. Do these facts make Zimmerman's choice
to follow Martin a criminally culpable cause of Martin's death?
The short (and long) answer to that question is no; however, that
answer has nothing to do with Stand Your Ground. Had Florida never re-
placed its Retreat rule with a No Retreat rule, that answer would be the
same.
1. Criminal Causation
First, some background information about the criminal conception
of cause, specifically the level and types of causation necessary to support a
criminal charge or conviction. Standard doctrine holds that to be convicted
of a crime the defendant's action must have been a "but for" or "actual"
cause of the harm prohibited by the criminal statute 9 -in the Zimmerman
case, the killing of another person. However, "but for" cause is rarely pre-
cise or accurate enough to draw a morally defensible line between criminal
culpability and its absence. Most events, including criminally prohibited
events, result from numberless "but for" causes. That Trayvon Martin was
born; that his parents got divorced; that his father had a new fianc6e; that
the fianc6e had purchased a town house in the Twin Lakes neighborhood;
that Trayvon left his house on the night he died; that he chose a particular 7-
Eleven at which to purchase Skittles, all could be labeled "but for" causes
of his death. If any one of them had not occurred, Martin would not have
encountered George Zimmerman that night and therefore would not have
died as and when he did. Does it follow that Martin's death should be
deemed a suicide because it was "caused" by his own choices (to leave the
house; to go to a 7-Eleven; etc.), or that his parents or the father's new fian-
c6e should be charged with homicide (for conceiving him; divorcing; pur-
chasing a home in Twin Lakes)? Of course not.
Similarly, "but for" the fact that George Zimmerman and his family
made a thousand different choices, including the choice to move into the
Twin Lakes neighborhood, Zimmerman would never have met Martin and
would not have shot him. But should the law treat those decisions, or Zim-
merman's decision to get out of bed that morning, or to go to the store at the
95. People v. Acosta, 284 Cal. Rptr. 17, 121-22 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
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time he did-or, for that matter, his parent's decision to give birth to him-
all probably "but for" causes of Martin's death-as culpable choices in that
death? Again, of course not. "But for" cause may be necessary, but is not
sufficient, to meet the criminal causation standard.
Thus, standard criminal doctrine adds a second causation require-
ment, which courts frequently refer to as "proximate cause." In addition to
being a "but for" cause of criminal harm, the defendant's act must also be a
proximate cause of the harm-meaning that the harm must be a reasonably
foreseeable result of the defendant's action at the time.96 Was it reasonably
foreseeable by Zimmerman that following Martin through the neighbor-
hood, itself a lawful act, would lead to a violent encounter and cause Mar-
tin's death? From the reasonable person's perspective before the event, that
seems like a very long stretch. Only proximate causes, causes that could
reasonably produce the harmful result prohibited by the criminal law, can
be valid bases for a criminal charge or conviction.9 7
2. The "Initial Aggressor" Rule in Self-Defense
A second and related misunderstanding about the law may be even
more to the point. Under the standard rules of self-defense, a defender who
first provokes the fight that ultimately leads to his or her use of deadly force
is usually deemed the "initial aggressor" in the altercation and must retreat
before using deadly force against the other, even if that defendant did not
originally anticipate a deadly confrontation and ultimately killed only to
save the defendant's own life.98
But what qualifies as "initial aggression" which deprives a defender
96. "An individual is criminally liable if his conduct was a sufficiently direct cause of the death,
and the ultimate harm is something which should have been foreseen as being reasonably related to his
acts." People v. Arzon, 401 N.Y.S.2d 156, 159 (N.Y. Sup Ct. 1978).
97. "To say one event proximately caused another ... means first that the former event caused the
latter. This is known as actual cause or cause in fact.... [T]o say that one event was a proximate cause
of another means that it was not just any cause, but one with a sufficient connection to the result." Pa-
roline v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1710, 1713 (2014).
98. Thus, in Florida for example, the justification of self-defense is not available to a person who:
(1) Is attempting to commit, committing, or escaping after the commission of, a
forcible felony; or
(2) Initially provokes the use or threatened use of force against himself or herself,
unless:
(a) Such force or threat of force is so great that the person reasonably believes that
he or she is in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm and that he or she
has exhausted every reasonable means to escape such danger other than the use or
threatened use of force which is likely to cause death or great bodily harm to the
assailant; or
(b) In good faith, the person withdraws from physical contact with the assailant
and indicates clearly to the assailant that he or she desires to withdraw and termi-
nate the use or threatened use of force, but the assailant continues or resumes the
use or threatened use of force.
FLA. STAT. § 776.041 (2014).
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of the right to self-defense? For example, was George Zimmerman the "ini-
tial aggressor" against Trayvon Martin because Zimmerman chose to follow
Martin, and at one point left his car to ask Martin what he was doing in the
neighborhood? The law in this area is not crystal clear; indeed, one academ-
ic commentator has named the "initial aggressor" rule as "one of the most
maddeningly indeterminate questions of criminal law."99 But general guide-
lines do exist, and as it happens they strongly suggest an answer in the
Zimmerman case. Consider this summary of the law, taken from a promi-
nent criminal law treatise,"oo which suggests various situations in which a
defendant ought, or ought not, to be deemed the "initial aggressor" in a
violent confrontation.
When is D the "Initial Aggressor"?
D "provokes" the encounter if D: D does NOT "provoke" the encounter if D:
* Assaults the deceased * Demands an explanation of offensive
* Fires the first shot in a standoff words or conduct
* Leaves a fight, only to return * Discusses a sensitive subject
with a weapon * Hurls inappropriate language and insult-
* Is caught sleeping with the de- ing epithets
ceased's wife * Engages in an inconsiderate act
* Travels near a neighbor who has previ-
ously threatened him
* Arms himself to repel an anticipated at-
tack, while going about normal business
* Provides an opportunity for conflict, but
does not cause it
Thus, if A is the first to assault B, then B escalates the
confrontation by introducing deadly force, and A ultimately kills B in order
to save A's own life, standard doctrine would deny A a self-defense claim
unless A had first tried to retreat or had exhausted every other possible
means of avoiding the use of deadly force.' 1o
Critics have argued that George Zimmerman's act of following and
verbally questioning Trayvon Martin, "provoked" the confrontation that led
to Martin's death and that Zimmerman should therefore be adjudged a
99. Michael J. Z. Mannheimer, Trayvon Marlin and the Initial Aggressor Issue, PRAWFSBLOG
(Mar. 26, 2012, 10:46 PM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2012/03/trayvon-martin-and-
the-initial-aggressor-issue.html.
100.2 WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW § 128 (15th ed. 1993).
101. See United States v. Peterson, 483 F.2d 1222, 1231 (D.C. Cir. 1973) ("[Olne who is the ag-
gressor in a conflict culminating in death cannot invoke the necessities of self-preservation. Only in the
event that he communicates to his adversary his intent to withdraw and in good faith attempts to do so is
he restored to his right of self-defense.").
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murderer.'0 2 But the authorities strongly suggest that this conclusion is
wrong-for reasons, once again, which have nothing to do with Stand Your
Ground. First, even if Zimmerman were deemed the initial aggressor in his
encounter with Martin, this fact would only require that he attempt to retreat
if he could safely do so, before using deadly force against his attacker. If no
safe retreat were possible-and again, under Zimmerman's account of the
facts, which were apparently accepted by the jury, he could not have
retreated at the moment he reasonably believed his life was in danger-then
he would still have the right to respond to the threat with deadly force.
Second, under the "initial aggressor" doctrine described above, a
defender is not deemed a provocateur for purposes of asserting self-defense
unless the defender "makes the first move" to assault, or attempt to assault,
the other person."03 Thus, following someone on property where both
people have the lawful right to be or asking the person to explain the
person's presence in the place, would not qualify as "provocative" behavior
for purposes of self-defense law, would not prompt a court to rule that the
defender was the "initial aggressor" in the ultimately fatal encounter, and
thus would not bar the survivor from asserting self-defense. Whether one
believes that George Zimmerman used good or bad judgment in following
Trayvon Martin on the night that Martin died, Zimmerman's proven
behavior almost certainly does not qualify him as the "initial aggressor"
under the law of self-defense.'0 4
3. Self-Defense Requires Reasonableness But Not Accuracy
Finally, opponents of Stand Your Ground sometimes misinterpret
yet another element of self-defense-the element of reasonable belief. Un-
der longstanding doctrine, a defender may justifiably use deadly force
against an attacker only if the defender honestly and reasonably believes
that such force is necessary to save him or her from death or serious inju-
ry.'s Thus, a defendant's belief in the threat and the need for a deadly re-
sponse must be both sincerely and reasonably held-but it does not have to
be accurate. A defendant who actually and reasonably, but incorrectly, be-
lieved in the necessity of using deadly force, and killed the attacker in doing
102. M. Alex Johnson, Prosecutors contend George Zimmerman provoked confrontation with
Trayvon Martin, NBC NEWS (Apr. 12, 2012), http://usnews.nbcnews.com/news/2012/04/12/11164328-
prosecutors-contend-george-zimmerman-provoked-confrontation-with-trayvon-martin.
103. 2 WHARTON'SCRIMINAL LAW § 128 (15th ed. 1993).
104. Again, even if it did, the rule in many states imposes only a Duty of Retreat in such
situations, requiring that an initial aggressor attempt to escape or use every other available means to
avoid using deadly force. If no such means exist at the moment of deadly confrontation and the initial
aggressor honestly and reasonably believed that deadly force was the only way to save the initial
aggressor's own life, state law would allow the initial aggressor to use such force and, presumably, to
later claim self-defense against a homicide charge. E.g., FLA. STAT. § 776.041 (2014) (citing the "initial
aggressor" rules in that state).
105. Peterson, 483 F.2d at 1229.
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so, may still claim self-defense, and this has long been the law in all Ameri-
can jurisdictions."o6 Suppose that C threatens to kill D, then moves his hand
toward his pocket as though to reach for a gun. D, believing that he is about
to be killed, pulls his own weapon and shoots C dead. It turns out that C
was not carrying a weapon and had been reaching only for his handkerchief.
Under longstanding self-defense doctrine, D would have an affirmative de-
fense."o' Although C in fact posed no danger of injury to D, D actually and
reasonably believed that C was about to kill him.
The reasonable belief standard has produced some hard cases in re-
cent years, and concerns about it may well be valid.0 s But objections to the
reasonable belief element should not be confused with Stand Your
Ground." The element of reasonable belief is a core feature of self-defense
law generally. Whether a jurisdiction operates under a Stand Your Ground
or a Retreat rule, a defendant who uses deadly force because the defendant
honestly and reasonably, though incorrectly, believed the defendant was in
danger of death or serious bodily injury, can successfully claim self-
defense.
Although the reasonable belief standard does not require the de-
fendant's belief to have been accurate, it nonetheless sets a fairly high bar to
claims of self-defense. Suppose, for example, that George Zimmerman,
feeling threatened by Trayvon Martin's mere presence in his neighborhood,
106. See, e.g., ZIMMERMAN FINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 85 ("The danger facing
George Zimmerman need not have been actual; however .. . the appearance of danger must have been
so real that a reasonably cautious and prudent person under the same circumstances would have believed
that the danger could be avoided only through the use of that force .... ); see also supra notes 10-17,
27 and accompanying text (discussing the American tradition of self-defense law).
107. Shorter v. People, 2 N.Y. 193, 201 (N.Y. 1849).
108. A number of recent cases raising the "reasonable belief" issue have involved fatal actions by
police. See, e.g., Death of Tamir Rice, 12-year-old shot by Cleveland police, ruled a homicide, WASH.
POST (Dec. 12, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2014/12/12/death-of-
tamir-rice-12-year-old-shot-by-cleveland-police-ruled-a-homicide ("The African American boy was
fatally shot by a white Cleveland police officer on Nov. 22. Officers had responded to a 911 call report-
ing a person pointing a gun-which turned out to be a toy pistol missing its orange safety cap."); Ama-
dou Diallo News, N.Y. TIMES (last visited May 15, 2015),
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/d/amadoudiallo/index.html (describing the
facts in the 1999 Diallo case). Mr. Diallo was killed by four New York City police officers who thought
Diallo had pulled a gun when in fact he had pulled out his wallet. Id. After his death it was discovered
that Mr. Diallo was unarmed at the time of his encounter with the police. Id. Similarly, although the re-
cent controversy over police officer Darren Wilson's fatal shooting of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Mis-
souri, invokes a number of legal issues involving police conduct more generally, confusion about the
"reasonable belief' standard may be a factor. Wilson's critics have argued that the unarmed Brown did
not in fact pose a deadly threat to Officer Wilson, but the self-defense standard requires only that Wilson
reasonably believe Brown posed such a threat. See Katie Sanders, Megyn Kelly. Al Sharpton declared
Michael Brown 'didn't use any deadly force' against officer, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Aug. 28, 2014, 5:29
PM), http://www.politifact.com/punditfact/statements/2014/aug/28/megyn-kelly/megyn-kelly-al-
sharpton-declared-michael-brown-did/ (describing the facts in Darren Wilson case). For present purpos-
es, the most important points are to understand what the elements of a legal self-defense claim actually
require.
109. Mark O'Mara, It's Not About 'Stand Your Ground,' It's About Race, CNN (Feb. 19, 2014,
4:36 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/02/19/opinion/omara-stand-your-ground-and-race/.
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had simply pulled out his gun and shot Martin. In that case the reasonable
belief element would not be satisfied-even if Zimmerman could show that
he actually believed he was in danger of life and limb, that belief would al-
most certainly be deemed unreasonable-and Zimmerman would be guilty
of criminal homicide. Similarly, had an armed Trayvon Martin felt threat-
ened by Zimmerman's presence behind him and turned around and shot
Zimmerman simply for following him down the road, Martin would not
have been able to claim self-defense. The no-defense result would apply in
both cases, and it would apply whether these imaginary events happened in
a Retreat or a Stand Your Ground jurisdiction. A person's mere presence in
your neighborhood, even if you subjectively feel threatened by that pres-
ence, does not establish reasonable grounds for killing the person. And fol-
lowing someone, without more, does not establish reasonable grounds to
kill the follower.
C. Resolving Doctrinal Confusion
As described above, the four main sources of doctrinal confusion
about Stand Your Ground concern: (1) Timing, (2) Causation, (3) Initial
Aggressor, and (4) Reasonable Belief. None of these signals structural or
inherent conceptual flaws in No Retreat rules. Whether in Stand Your
Ground or Retreat jurisdictions, longstanding self-defense doctrine provides
that a defender's right to self-defense begins only at the moment when the
defender reasonably believes that he or she is faced with deadly force and
reasonably believes that deadly force is necessary. "But for" causation is
not enough to prove a criminal case, whether the case occurs in a Stand
Your Ground or a Retreat jurisdiction (or whether the crime charged is
homicide or some lesser violation). The initial aggressor rule, in both Re-
treat and No Retreat states, denies self-defense to a defendant who has
made the first move to assault, or attempt to assault, the defendant's antag-
onist, and extends the defense to persons who were lawfully in the place
where they were attacked and were not otherwise at fault in the encounter.
Finally, defenders in both Retreat and Stand Your Ground jurisdictions may
not claim self-defense any time they feel threatened. They may only claim
the defense if, and when, they honestly and reasonably believed themselves
to be threatened with death or serious bodily injury and that using deadly
force against their attacker was strictly necessary.
IV. The Politics of Stand Your Ground
Recall that early courts and commentators, against the backdrop of
a generally applicable Duty to Retreat, nonetheless identified a number of
situations in which an innocent defender could stand his or her ground even
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if that meant using deadly force that killed the attacker."o In the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries, American courts expanded the No Re-
treat rule. Leading state cases, such as Erwin and Runyan, and United States
Supreme Court cases, such as Beard and Brown, justified the adoption of
the Stand Your Ground approach in terms of core values viewed as central
to the law's mission in this area, principally the values of fairness, accurate
fact-finding, justice toward criminal defendants, and the preservation of
human life. "'
Thus, a number of important, and legally relevant, values supported
the rise and expansion of Stand Your Ground laws. But contemporary polit-
ical critics attack Stand Your Ground on the basis of its supposed harmful
effects-in particular, that No Retreat rules (1) are invoked and enforced in
a racially discriminatory manner and that they (2) produce unacceptably
high levels of gun violence or unjustified homicides or both. This Part ex-
amines the evidence for those claims.
A. The Charge That Stand Your Ground is Racist
Few argue that Stand Your Ground rules are motivated by the con-
scious desire to disadvantage vulnerable minority groups. Instead, the ar-
gument is that Stand Your Ground laws have the effect of hurting such
groups, either by disadvantaging minority defendants (for example, denying
self-defense claims when similar claims by white defendants would be suc-
cessful), or by disadvantaging minority homicide victims (for example, ac-
quitting defendants who claim self-defense after killing an African-
American person when similar claims would not be successful had the hom-
icide victim been white)." 2 Michael Yaki of the United States Commission
on Civil Rights voiced this concern when he announced the Commission's
intent to investigate "whether or not . . . there is bias in the assertion or the
denial of Stand Your Ground, depending on the race of the victim or the
race of the person asserting the defense .... "ll3 Trayvon Martin, of course,
was African-American while his killer, Zimmerman, was Hispanic and
white. In the minds of some, the Zimmerman-Martin case became a stand-
in for the claim that Stand Your Ground is racist in one or both of the ways
110. Supra text accompanying notes 24-39 (discussing the views expressed in early English and
American treatises).
I 11. Brown v. United States, 256 U.S. 335, 344 (1921); Beard v. United States, 158 U.S. 550, 561
(1895); Runyan v. State, 57 Ind. 80, 84 (Ind. 1877); Erwin v. State, 29 Ohio St. 186, 199 (Ohio 1876);
supra text accompanying notes 39-58.
112. Faith Karimi, 'Raise Your Voice, Not Your Hands'Cops Urge as Zimmerman Verdict Looms,
CNN (July 10, 2013, 10:24 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/07/10/justice/florida-zimmerman-backlash/.
113. Amanda Terkel, "Stand Your Ground" Laws to be Scrutinized for Racial Bias by Civil Rights
Commission, HUFFINGTON POST (May 21, 2013, 2:03 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/05/31/stand-your-ground-racial-bias-n_3365893.html; see also
Yamiche Alcindor, Officials Plan to Take Closer Look at Stand- Your-Ground Laws, USA TODAY (June
9, 2012, 12:20 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/story/2012-06-09/trayvon-martin-
stand-your-ground/55480352/1 (discussing the review of Stand Your Ground laws).
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just described.
The question raised is this: In self-defense cases invoking Stand
Your Ground, are minority defendants and minority victims treated more
harshly than their white counterparts because of race?
1. Two-Tiered Inquiry
As a threshold matter, consider that "empirical" questions of public
policy often have two broad dimensions that should be, but frequently are
not, distinguished. One dimension is purely descriptive, the other value-
driven. The purely descriptive question focuses on what the factual evi-
dence says about the question raised. For example, what does the available
data tell us about whether minority defendants and minority homicide vic-
tims are disadvantaged by Stand Your Ground laws and about whether
Stand Your Ground laws produce higher levels of gun violence or of unjus-
tified homicides?
The second question is primarily normative and only derivatively
empirical. It asks what type, quantity, weight, and degree of descriptive ev-
idence should mandate a change in policy; answering it requires the de-
ployment of value judgments which respond to those questions. Thus, to
take an example that is outside the present topic, suppose that only two
methods of inflicting the death penalty exist-Method A and Method B.
And suppose further that a set of unimpeachable data were to demonstrate
that using Method A, on average, inflicts a relatively small but identifiably
greater amount of physical pain on the condemned person, during the exe-
cution process, than does Method B. Does this empirical fact alone mandate
that jurisdictions which allow capital punishment should no longer use
Method A?ll 4 Different people would answer this question differently, de-
pending on their various methods of weighing all the costs and benefits that
go into choosing a method of capital punishment, and their individual sense
of the "rightness" or "wrongness" of inflicting pain on a condemned person
during the execution procedure. Deciding whether the new data about pain
suggests that states should no longer use Method A requires that the data be
filtered through a normative lens of some kind, and because normative
lenses are quite numerous and different from each other, when people filter
facts in this way, they will ultimately come out on different sides of almost
any policy question. Empirical data is useful-indeed, often essential-but
they play only a partial and ultimately derivative role in structuring law and
public policy.
Returning to the policy issues that are raised by Stand Your
Ground, it seems clear that looking to the "facts" requires at least two stag-
es and types of analysis. First, there are purely empirical questions: for ex-
114. Leaving aside, for present purposes, any constitutional or other doctrinal issues that might be
raised at this point.
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ample, whether available or acquirable data can tell us if Stand Your
Ground laws in fact disadvantage minority criminal defendants or homicide
victims because of their race, and whether the data convincingly show that
Stand Your Ground produces higher levels of gun violence in general or of
unjustified killing in particular. Assuming we can convincingly answer the
descriptive questions, the second-tier questions then arise-whether or not
the data justify changes in the law. The second question can only be an-
swered by reference to our values and beliefs about justice, equality, and
fairness of the criminal law.
2. The Empirical Evidence
With respect to the racial impact of Stand Your Ground, it probably
goes without saying that the descriptive and normative questions are nearly
coterminous. The value of racial equality is now so deeply engrained in our
culture that if the available facts were to clearly demonstrate that Stand
Your Ground claims by minority defendants are more likely to be denied
because of race, or killers of minority victims are more likely to be granted
such claims than those who kill white victims, most people would view that
as a very serious problem requiring a fix. What, then, do the facts say about
this question?
Start with a general, and perhaps under-reported, fact: Acquittals on
grounds of self-defense (of which Stand Your Ground based acquittals are a
subset) are extremely rare. According to data compiled by the Federal Bu-
reau of Investigation, in 2010 only 2.5 7% of homicides were deemed justi-
fied.' 15 Relatedly, over the five years between 2006 and 2010, the total
number of justifiable homicides using a firearm was 1,031-an average of
about 200 per year.l 6 This is not to suggest that Stand Your Ground laws
are not important, only that their impact on the daily lives of most Ameri-
cans may be less dramatic than recent headlines have suggested.
Now consider the issue of Stand Your Ground in particular. First,
the purely descriptive question: Does the empirical evidence demonstrate
that Stand Your Ground laws discriminate against racial minorities, either
as defendants or as homicide victims? At least at this point, the answer has
to be no.
Surveying the available data makes this clear. In 2012, for example,
the Tampa Bay Times assembled a list of 192 Florida homicide cases that
115. JOHN K. ROMAN, URBAN INSTITUTE, RACE, JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDE, AND STAND YOUR
GROUND LAWS: ANALYSIS OF FBI SUPPLEMENTARY HOMICIDE REPORT DATA 3 (2013); see also
VIOLENCE POLICY CENTER, FIREARM JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDES AND NON-FATAL SELF-DEFENSE GUN
USE: AN ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION AND NATIONAL CRIME VICTIMIZATION
SURVEY DATA 1 (2013) ("Guns are rarely used to kill criminals or stop crimes. In 2010, across the na-
tion there were only 230 justifiable homicides involving a private citizen using a firearm reported to the
Federal Bureau of Investigation's Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program as detailed in its Supple-
mentary Homicide Report (SHR).").
116. VIOLENCE POLICY CENTER, supra note 115, at 2.
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involved a Stand Your Ground claim since 2005 (the year the Florida legis-
lature passed its Stand Your Ground statute)." 7 One key finding caught fire
in the political arena: With respect to the treatment of homicide victims by
race, the Times study found a significant difference between the treatment
of defendants who killed a black victim versus defendants who killed a
white victim. "[P]eople who killed a black person walked free 73 percent of
the time, while those who killed a white person went free 59 percent of the
time.""
What was not as widely reported were the important caveats which
attended this finding. Discussing the above result, the Times itself conclud-
ed that its "analysis does not prove that race caused the disparity between
cases with black and white victims. Other factors may be at play. The anal-
ysis, for example, found that black victims were more likely to be carrying
a weapon . .. [and] were more likely than whites to be committing a crime .
"119
The Times's review found "many cases where people went free af-
ter killing a black victim under questionable circumstances. . . . But the
Times found similarly questionable cases in which the victim was white or
Hispanic.120 It also found that mixed-race cases-like that of [Trayvon]
Martin-are relatively rare."'2 1
On the question of how Stand Your Ground claims by black de-
fendants are treated vis-a-vis such claims by white defendants, the Times
found no clear bias in the treatment of black defendants. Indeed, in at least
one respect it appeared that Florida's black defendants who argued Stand
Your Ground received more lenient legal treatment than white defendants
who made a Stand Your Ground claim. As the Times summarized its find-
117. Susan Taylor Martin et al., Race Plays Complex Role in Florida's 'Stand Your Ground' Law,
TAMPA BAY TIMES (June 2, 2012, 1:00 PM), http://www.tampabay.com/news/courts/criminal/race-
plays-complex-role-in-floridas-stand-your-ground-law/1233152. The newspaper published key details
about the Stand Your Ground claims it canvassed: "The Times included 118 cases in which a 'stand your
ground' immunity hearing before a judge was requested. In the majority of the remaining cases, a law
enforcement official, prosecutor or defense attorney invoked the law. The Times also included twenty-
nine cases where circumstances appeared to reflect the Legislature's intent [of the law] . . .
11 8. Id.
119. Id.; see also John Lott, Perspective: In Defense of Stand Your Ground Laws, CHICAGO TRIB.,
(Oct. 28, 2013), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-10-28/opinion/ct-oped- 1029-guns-
20131029 Iground-laws-blacks-ground-defense ("The [Times's] data shows blacks killed in these con-
frontations were 13 percentage points more likely to be armed than whites. This suggests that those
claiming that they were defending themselves often reasonably believed that they had little choice but to
kill their attacker."). Lott also noted that the Times collected a lot of other information regarding the
Stand Your Ground Cases including whether the victim initiated the confrontation, whether the defend-
ant was on his own property when the shooting occurred, whether a witness was present, whether there
was physical evidence, whether the defendant pursued the victim, and the type of case. Id. Lou then ran
regressions with this data to see if the factors might explain the different conviction rates for whites and
blacks. Id. He found that "[sluch analysis finds no evidence of discrimination. While the results are not
statistically significant, the regressions suggest that any racial bias would go the other way-that killing
a black rather than a white increases the defendant's odds of being convicted." Id.
120. Martin et al., supra note 117.
12 1. Id.
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ings:
* Whites who invoked the [stand your ground] law were
charged at the same rate as blacks.
* Whites who went to trial were convicted at the same rate as
blacks.
* In mixed-race cases involving fatalities, the outcomes were
similar. Four of the five blacks who killed a white went free;
five of the six whites who killed a black went free.
* Overall, black defendants went free 66 percent of the time
in fatal cases compared to 61 percent for white defendants-
a difference explained, in part, by the fact blacks were more
likely to kill another black.1 22
Although the newspaper acknowledged that its racially disparate re-
sults as to victims reflect "numerous studies showing disparities in the way
whites and blacks are treated by the criminal justice system [in contexts
other than Stand Your Ground or self-defense]," even here the Times cau-
tioned: "Experts note that most cases have unique combinations of facts and
circumstances that determine whether a person goes free or goes to prison.
They caution against drawing conclusions on statistics alone." 23 This cau-
tion is especially merited when those statistics are drawn from such a small
number of cases and the statistical difference-five percent-is also quite
small.
Next, in 2012, Chandler B. McClellan and Erdal Tekin published a
paper reporting on their analysis of United States Vital Statistics data from
the National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS).'2 4 McClellan and Tekin
assembled information about firearm related homicides between the years
2000 and 2010 and correlated that information with data concerning which
states had adopted Stand Your Ground statutes, when those laws became
effective, and how (if at all) the number of firearm-related homicides
changed after Stand Your Ground laws were passed in the various states.1 25
On the question of Stand Your Ground's racial impact, McClellan
and Tekin reported: "[O]ur gender and race specific analyses indicate that
the rise in homicides [associated with recently adopted Stand Your Ground
statutes] is primarily driven by the deaths among whites, especially white
males, while we generally find no effect on blacks." 26 Thus, "[w]e find no
122. Id.; see also VIOLENCE POLICY CENTER, supra note 115, at 5 ("For the five-year period 2006
through 2010, 7.6 percent (32) of the persons killed by black shooters were white, 92.2 percent (388)
were black, none were Asian, 0.2 percent (one) were American Indian, and none were of unknown
race.").
123. Martin et al., supra note 117.
124. Chandler B McClellan & Erdal Tekin, Stand Your Ground Laws, Homicides, and Injuries 12
(Nat'1 Bureau of Econ. Research, Worker Paper, Working Paper No. 18187, 2012).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 31.
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evidence to suggest that these laws increase homicides among blacks."1 27
Again, the numbers are very small here. But if the numbers matter, then all
the numbers should matter-both those that support the hypothesis of racial
discrimination, and those that do not.
Finally, in July 2013, social scientist John K. Roman of the Urban
Institute published an analysis, based on FBI data from 2005 to 2010, of the
nationwide racial impact of Stand Your Ground laws on justifiable homi-
cides.1 28 Dr. Roman reported that a total of 2.57% of homicides during this
period (1,365 out of 53,019) were deemed justified,1 29 that "[w]hite-on-
black homicides were most likely to be ruled justified (11.4%),130 and [that]
black-on-white homicides were least likely to be ruled justified (1.2%)."'
When Roman sifted the data for elements similar to the facts in the Trayvon
Martin case, (single shooter, single victim, both shooter and victim are
male, shooter and victim strangers to each other, and the victim was killed
with a firearm), he found that the rate of justifiable homicides was almost
six times higher in cases with attributes that matched the Martin case.'1 2 He
also found that "[r]acial disparities are much larger, as white-on-black hom-
icides have justifiable findings 33 percentage points more often than black-
on-white homicides. Stand Your Ground laws appear to exacerbate those
differences, as cases overall are significantly more likely to be ruled justi-
fied in SYG [Stand Your Ground] states than in non-SYG states . . . ."'
Dr. Roman concluded: "Overall, states with SYG laws have statis-
tically significantly higher rates of justifiable homicides than non-SYG
states." He also found that "The presence of a SYG law is associated with a
statistically significant increase in the likelihood a homicide is ruled to be
justified for white-on-black, black-on-black, and white-on-white homicide .
... The change in likelihood for black-on-white homicides being found jus-
tified is not significant . . . ."134
Dr. Roman also acknowledged significant gaps in the data on which
he based his conclusions. Although he identified "racial disparities" in the
rates that homicides were found to be justified, he conceded that in his
127. Id. at 2; see also GRUBER, supra note 20, at 1008 ("[The McClellan & Tekin study] indicates
that the law's primary racial effect is increasing the probability of white male deaths by shooting, with
no general effect on African American populations.").
128. ROMAN, supra note 115, at 4. "Cases were coded as having occurred in an SYG state if the
law was statutory and not a judicial precedent." Id. This is a puzzling omission, which by definition ex-
cludes states with common law Stand Your Ground regimes. States with longstanding common-law No
Retreat rules could presumably provide longer-term data about the effects of Stand Your Ground than
states that have just recently adopted Stand Your Ground by statute.
129. Id. at 6.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at9.
133. Id. at 7.
134. Id. at 1; see also GRUBER, supra note 20, at 1010-11 (noting that one data set in Roman's
study involved "Martin attributes"). The data were not consistent with the hypothesis that stand your
ground has had racially disparate impact. Id
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analysis "the phrase 'racial disparity' is value free: the presence of a racial
disparity is a necessary but insufficient condition to identify racial animus
in criminal case processing. Racial animus can only be causally identified if
all other competing explanations for the existence of a racial disparity can
be rejected."' Such variables could not be discounted in the data with
which Dr. Roman was working because: (1) his data dealt only with infor-
mation about cases in which perpetrators were apprehended, leaving out an
estimated 40% of cases in which perpetrators had not yet been identified;' 6
and (2) the data did not include information about where the homicide oc-
curred, which is "relevant to determining the presence of racial animus. If,
for instance, white-on-black homicides were mainly defensive shootings in
a residence or business, and black-on-white shootings mainly occurred dur-
ing the commission of a street crime, then the disparity would be warranted.
This last issue is particularly important."'3 7 Thus, Roman acknowledged
that it was possible his racial disparity findings were not associated with
"any conscious or unconscious racial animus in the justice system."' He
stated that if the facts surrounding white-on-black homicides and black-on-
white homicides were different, "such that one routinely occurs as part of
self-defense and the other as part of a street crime," then it was possible that
there was no animus.' 39 "The data here cannot completely address this prob-
lem because the setting of the incident cannot be observed. Thus, the analy-
sis is at risk due to omitted variable bias, where the lack of a data element
leads to a spurious conclusion."'40
In a separate article discussing the data in his report, Dr. Roman
wrote:
What's lacking in these data is the context of the killing. We
know that homicides with a black perpetrator and a white victim
are more likely to be robberies or burglaries that go sideways and
end up in death-we just don't know how often this happens. Are
robberies gone bad 10 times more likely with a black assailant?
We don't know. But we need to find out to understand this dis-
parity.
The flip side is that we also do not know much about white-on-
black killings. We know that between 2005 and 2009, there were
about 80,000 homicides in the United States. Since we don't
know who the killer was in about 40% of murders, we only know
135. Id.
136. John K. Roman, It 's Time to Separate Race and Firearms Policy, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb.
20, 2014, 3:29 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/john-roman-phd/its-time-to-separate-race-and-us-
firearms-policyb48 10824.html.
137. ROMAN, supra note 115, at 2.
138. Id. at I1.
139. Id.
140. Id.
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all the facts of the case in a little fewer than 50,000 homicides.' 4 '
But, out of just under 50,000 homicides, an older white man
killed a younger black man with a gun when they were strangers
and neither was law enforcement only 23 times. [Michael] Dunn
and [George] Zimmerman thus participated in extremely rare
events. Neither was convicted,1 42 which was the outcome of nine
of the 23 cases with that fact pattern (39 percent). By contrast,
when a black American kills a white American, it is ruled to be
justified about 1 percent of the time.1 43
Dr. Roman calls for further research to explore the possible reasons for this
disparity. "
Further empirical data on the topic of Stand Your Ground is un-
doubtedly in the works, and unbiased analysis of such data will be very
welcome. As the evidence stands now, empirical data do not demonstrate
that Stand Your Ground laws are racist or that they systematically disad-
vantage persons of color because of their race.
3. Stand Your Ground Laws Cause More Gun Violence, More Unjustified
Killings, or Both
A second set of empirical claims about Stand Your Ground laws
concerns their effect on gun violence in general and firearm-related homi-
cides in particular. The arguments here range from claims that No Retreat
rules deter violence and save innocent lives, to claims that these laws gen-
erate more violence and more homicides than would exist under a Duty to
Retreat regime.
Two 2012 National Bureau of Economic Research papers have at-
tracted a fair amount of media attention. In their paper Stand Your Ground
Laws, Homicides, and Injuries, Chandler McClellan and Erdal Tekin report
that their "results indicate that Stand Your Ground laws are associated with
a significant increase in the number of homicides among whites, especially
white males.' 45 According to our estimates, between 28 and 33 additional
141. Id.
142. Dr. Roman's article was published in 2013, the year that George Zimmerman was acquit-
ted in the killing of Trayvon Martin. In 2014, Michael Dunn was convicted of first-degree murder in the
shooting death of African American teenager Jordan Davis. Dunn was sentenced to life without the pos-
sibility of parole. Michael Dunn Sentenced to Life Without Parole for Loud Music Killing, ABC NEWS
(June 9, 2014), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/michael-dunn-sentenced-life-without-parole-
loud-music-killing-n228191; Michael Dunn to be Retried for Murder in Sept. in Loud Music Shooting,
BAY NEWS (June 9, 2014, 11:47 AM),
http://www.baynews9.com/content/news/baynews9/news/article.html/content/news/articles/cfn/2014/6/9
/michael dunn retrial.html.
143. Roman, supra note 136.
144. Id.
145. MCCLELLAN & TEKIN, supra note 124, at 2.
2015] 125
AM. J. CRIM. L.
white males are killed each month as a result of these laws."'46 The authors
conclude: "[O]ur findings raise serious doubts against the argument that the
stand your ground laws serve as a deterrent for crime. On the contrary, we
show consistent evidence that these laws are associated with an increase in
crime, at least measured by homicides, especially among white males."l4 7
Professor Andrew Gelman, a statistician and director of the Applied
Statistics Center at Columbia University, has highlighted potential problems
with McClellan and Tekin's data and conclusions. In a June 2012 blogpost,
Professor Gelman challenges the authors' regressions.' 8 Professor Gelman
then comments: "[E]ven if Stand Your Ground laws really did increase
homicides, I could imagine people still supporting the laws on the ground
that some of these homicides were justifiable. I suppose that would be the
next stage of research but it would take a lot more effort . ."49 In short,
what appears to be both essential, and missing, from McClellan and Tekin's
empirical data is complete and reliably accurate information about (1) the
alleged increase in homicides resulting from Stand Your Ground laws gen-
erally, and, to the extent that the increase is real, (2) information about what
proportion of such homicides is justified.
Another analysis of the relationship between Stand Your Ground
laws and violence is equally problematic. In their 2012 paper, Does
Strengthening Self-Defense Law Deter Crime or Escalate Violence? Evi-
dence from the Castle Doctrine, Cheng Cheng and Mark Hoekstra used data
from the FBI Uniform Crime Reports to analyze the question of whether
Stand Your Ground laws deter or encourage the use of lethal force.i'o Like
McClellan and Tekin, Cheng and Hoekstra suggest their findings support
the conclusion that No Retreat laws increase the number of homicides:
Estimates indicate that the [Stand Your Ground] laws increase
homicides by a statistically significant 8 percent, which translates
into an additional 600 homicides per year across states that ex-
panded Castle Doctrine. . . . We further show that this divergence
in homicide rates at the time of Castle Doctrine law enactment is
larger than any divergence between the same groups of states at
any time in the last 40 years, and that magnitudes of this size
arise rarely by chance when randomly assigning placebo laws in
similarly structured data sets covering the years prior to Castle
Doctrine expansion. In short, we find compelling evidence that
146. Id.
147. Id. at 32.
148. Andrew Gelman, Stand Your Ground Laws and Homicides, STATISTICAL MODELING,
CAUSAL INFERENCE, AND SOCIAL SCIENCE (June 27, 2012, 11:12 PM),
http://andrewgelman.com/2012/06/27/stand-your-ground-laws-and-homicides/.
149. Id.
150. Cheng Cheng & Mark Hoekstra, Does Strengthening Self-Defense Law Deter Crime or Esca-
late Violence? Evidence from Expansions to Castle Doctrine, 48 J. HUM. RES. 821, 823 (2013) (note that
the authors use Castle Doctrine synonymously with Stand Your Ground and No Retreat).
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by lowering the expected costs associated with using lethal force,
Castle Doctrine laws induce more of it.' 5 '
But Cheng and Hoekstra acknowledge a critical hole in the data-
their information does not reveal how many of the additional homicides in
Stand Your Ground states are justified.'52 If many or most were deemed jus-
tified, then advocates of Stand Your Ground could argue that the new No
Retreat laws are doing the job they were meant to do-ensuring that inno-
cent and law-abiding citizens have the right to defend themselves against
unlawful and deadly attacks. Cheng and Hoekstra hazard "back-of-the-
envelope" calculations, which in their view suggest that at least some of the
additional homicides were not legally justified. They emphasized, however,
that conclusions on this issue depend on assumptions regarding the degree
and nature of the underreporting of justifiable homicide by police to the
FBI.'53 In short, the authors acknowledge that police underreporting may be
a significant problem with both their data and their conclusions about the
justifiability of the homicides reported in the data.15 4
As with the empirical data about race and Stand Your Ground, we
await further information on the factual question of whether No Retreat
laws cause more homicides or not. But even if such data were confirmed-
if the data showed indisputably that Stand Your Ground laws do result in an
increased number of homicides-those results would not answer the core
policy question: Whether Stand Your Ground laws should be repealed or
not. Answering the policy question requires engaging the normative issues
that ultimately decide questions of public policy. Even if a significant per-
centage were found justified, we cannot know what to make of that on a
policy level until we decide what costs we are willing to pay to keep Stand
Your Ground laws on the books. In short, we must make a value judgment
that tells us at what point an increased number of homicides crosses our
151. Id. at 823-24.
152. See id. at 849 ("A critical question is whether all the additional homicides that were reported
as murders or non-negligent manslaughters could have been legally justified.")
153. Id. at 848; see also id at 828 ("The major disadvantage of [the FBI's Supplemental Homicide
Report data on justifiable homicides] data is that they are widely believed to be underreported; Kleck
(1988) estimates that around one-fifth of legally justified homicides are reported that way to the FBI.
However, note that we use this data only to look for evidence of relative changes in legally justified
homicide."). While the best back-of-the-envelope estimate is that roughly half of the additional homi-
cides caused by Castle Doctrine are legally justified, stronger assumptions about the degree of underre-
porting (e.g., one-tenth compared to one-fifth) can lead one to conclude that all of the additional homi-
cides caused by Castle Doctrine are legally justified. Id. The authors emphasize that any conclusion
"depends on assumptions about the nature and degree of underreporting of legally justified homicides."
Id. at 848.
154. Id. John R. Lott, Jr. has also criticized Cheng and Hoekstra's methodology, questioning their
exclusion of pre-2005 Stand Your Ground laws from the analysis. JOHN R. LOTT, JR., TESTIMONY
BEFORE THE U.S. SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE'S ON THE CONSTITUTION, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND HUMAN
RIGHTS: HEARING ON "'STAND YOUR GROUND' LAWS: CIVIL RIGHTS AND PUBLIC SAFETY
IMPLICATIONS OF THE EXPANDED USE OF DEADLY FORCE" HEARTLAND INSTITUTE (2013),
https://www.heartland.org/sites/default/files/lott sygsenate testimonyrev oct 29.pdf
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moral threshold and makes Stand Your Ground the wrong policy choice.
V. Stand Your Ground, Politics, and Law
Like most other policy choices, the choice between Retreat and No
Retreat rules carries risk of harm on both ends. What determines society's
choice of legal policy is not only the existing degree of risk but also the
moral intuitions we bring to the choice.
A. Reciprocal Risks
Remember that under the Retreat rule, a defendant who responds to
a deadly attack with deadly force cannot claim self-defense unless (1) the
defendant could not have safely retreated without killing the attacker; or in
some jurisdictions, (2) as an objective matter the defendant might have been
able to retreat safely but the defendant was not subjectively aware of this.'
One risk is that Retreat rules may give the guilty party, the aggressor, an
advantage over the innocent party in a deadly confrontation. In Culverson,
the Nevada Supreme Court expressed this view when it explained its rejec-
tion of the Retreat approach by declaring, "a rule requiring a non-aggressor
to retreat confers a benefit on the aggressor and a detriment on the non-
aggressor."'56 Retreat rules require that before using deadly force, the inno-
cent person facing attack must calculate the options for retreat, evaluate his
or her chances of escape, and assess the assailant's possible responses. In
the view of the Culverson court, that amounts to advantaging the aggressor
over the non-aggressor-protecting the guilty over the innocent.' 57 Thus,
some believe that the Retreat approach systematically privileges aggressors
over non-aggressors and unjustly deprives the latter of a very basic legal
protection, protection from unprovoked aggression."' If life is to be lost in
a deadly confrontation, the law should preserve the life of the innocent law-
abiding citizen over that of the unlawful aggressor.
A second risk of the Retreat rule involves a more general eviden-
tiary difficulty in the criminal law: the difficulty of proving or disproving a
defendant's knowledge or conscious purpose. Retreat rules pose the risk
that some defendants will be convicted when they were actually justified in
killing the victim. The jury may incorrectly decide that the defendant could
155. E.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-19(b) (2009) ("[A] person is not justified in using deadly phys-
ical force upon another person if he or she knows that he or she can avoid the necessity of using such
force with complete safety (1) by retreating . .. .").
156. Culverson v. State, 797 P.2d 238, 240 (Nev. 1990).
157. Id. at 240; see also supra text accompanying notes 73-75 (discussing the decision in Culver-
son).
158. See Mordechai Kremnitzer & Khalid Ghanayim, Proportionality and the Aggressor's Culpa-
bility in Self-Defense, 39 TULSA L. REv. 875, 882 (2004) ("[A]s a rule, if there is any duty of retreat as-
sociated with self-defense, it is quite limited. Any other approach would grant an unlawful aggressor an
advantage over his victim, and could encourage violence.").
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have retreated, and knew he or she could have retreated, when in fact that
was not so-and may unjustly deny the defendant's self-defense claim on
that basis. Juries may convict on grounds that the defendant should have
known, despite statutory language requiring that the state prove the defend-
ant actually did know, about the availability of a completely safe retreat.1 59
The Culverson court expressed this concern, noting that a jury often finds it
quite difficult to determine whether "a person should reasonably believe
that he may retreat from a violent attack in complete safety. Thus, a rule
that requires a non-aggressor to retreat may confuse the jury and lead to in-
consistent verdicts. We believe that a simpler [No Retreat] rule will lead to
more just verdicts."' The risk is that some defendants will be convicted
when they were actually justified in killing the victim.
Risks also exist under a Stand Your Ground regime. By definition,
No Retreat rules allow a defendant to successfully claim self-defense alt-
hough the defendant did not retreat-even, presumably, when the defendant
could have safely done so. The concern here is that Stand Your Ground
might actually violate the law's perceived duty to preserve life because it
encourages the killing of a wrongdoer under circumstances where that death
was avoidable and therefore unnecessary. 161
Dropping the Retreat requirement could also make it easier for de-
fendants to credibly argue self-defense when, in fact, they did not act justi-
fiably. With only the defendant left alive to tell the tale, Stand Your Ground
laws can deprive the state of an inquiry-whether or not the defendant tried
to retreat before killing the other party-which could help juries decide if
the defendant truly acted in self-defense. Stand Your Ground laws, in other
words, may make it difficult to prove whether or not the defendant really
did fear imminent death or bodily harm. Even if the defendant's fear was
reasonable given the best ex post understanding of the facts and the situa-
tion, did the defendant actually experience extreme fear at the time? That is
a difficult jury question and the lack of a Retreat rule may tilt the balance in
favor of a lying defendant who, having killed the other party in the confron-
tation, now has a solo opportunity to convince the jury that the defendant
was actually and reasonably afraid of death or serious injury at the time he
or she used deadly force against the other party. The concern here is that
such defendants will literally "get away with murder"-that the jury will
accept a defendant's false account of the facts because it is not contestable
159. Similar concerns abound in other criminal law contexts; where judges and other commenta-
tors have worried that juries would convict a defendant on a lower standard of culpability than that re-
quired by the applicable criminal statute. E.g., United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697, 707 (9th Cir. 1976)
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("The [jury instruction's] failure to emphasize ... that subjective belief is the
determinative factor, [for possession] may allow a jury to convict on an objective theory of knowledge .
160. Culverson, 797 P.2d at 240.
161. See Joseph H. Beale, Retreat from a Murderous Assault, 16 HARv. L. REV. 567, 577, 580-82
(1903) (criticizing the "brutal doctrine" of Stand Your Ground for elevating honor over the sanctity of
human life).
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by the deceased victim.
Thus, both the Retreat and Stand Your Ground approaches carry
potential risks of harm. The empirical evidence cannot tell us which set of
risks we should take. Indeed, to the extent-and it seems to be a very great
extent-that empirical studies of Stand Your Ground have been motivated
by "hot" political issues such as racism and gun violence, they may actually
obscure the core problems that should really drive discussions about struc-
turing, or restructuring, the law of self-defense. When ideology drives the
search for facts, then facts tend to become the pawns of political strategy.
So it seems here. Some who induced from the facts of the Zimmerman case
that Stand Your Ground has racist effects cite the existing statistical studies
for partial and misleading numbers, which support that position.1 62 At the
same time, some who favor Stand Your Ground are too quick to dismiss the
possibility that No Retreat rules may require society to absorb increased
costs in certain types of cases. 163 Looking away from politics and toward
the reciprocal risks posed by Retreat and No Retreat rules suggests firmer
legal ground on which to conduct the inquiry.
From the discussion thus far, we can hypothesize that Stand Your
Ground poses the risk of acquitting guilty defendants, while Duty to Retreat
poses the risk of convicting innocent defendants. If the criminal law must
choose between these two sets of risk, then the presumption of innocence
might decide the question." On this view, if one legal rule risks convicting
innocent defendants and the other risks acquitting guilty ones, we should
choose the latter rule on the ground that it is better to let guilty defendants
go free than to unjustly punish the innocent. 165
But this cannot be a complete answer. Most would agree not only
that some risk of convicting the innocent inheres in every criminal process,
but also that such risk certainly exists in our own criminal process, which
162. See, e.g., The Problems with "Stand Your Ground", DREAM DEFENDERS,
http://dreamdefenders.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/Dream-Defenders-Stand-Your-Ground.pdf (last
visited Mar. 4, 2015) (citing Tampa Bay Times findings that Stand Your Ground defenses tended to be
more successful in cases involving a black victim, and that there was a fourteen point difference be-
tween acquittal rates of those claiming self-defense under Florida's Stand Your Ground law who killed
white people compared to those who killed black people).
163. See, e.g., Patrik Jonsson, Racial bias and 'stand your ground' laws: what the data show,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Aug. 6, 2013), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2013/0806/Racial-
bias-and-stand-your-ground-laws-what-the-data-show (quoting a gun rights historian's claims that Stand
Your Ground opposition "is just politics").
164. Legally the "presumption of innocence" is often specifically linked with the high standard of
proof, beyond a reasonable doubt, in criminal prosecutions. See Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432,
453 (1895) (linking the presumption of innocence to the burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt). However, the principle has freestanding resonance as well. See id. ("The principle that there is a
presumption of innocence in favor of the accused is the undoubted law, axiomatic and elementary, and
its enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law."). Logically, it does not
seem to be too far a stretch to apply the presumption to the structure of legal rules as well as to their im-
plementation and proof in the courtroom.
165. Id. at 455-56 (compiling sources to this effect).
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has resulted in numerous convictions of innocent people despite its
longstanding embrace of the presumption of innocence. At some level we
acknowledge that convicting and punishing the guilty requires that we ac-
cept the risk of unjust convictions. Given the inherent imperfections of hu-
man institutions, the only way for the criminal law to eliminate such risk
entirely would be not to convict anybody at all, and we are not willing to go
this far. The law acknowledges, and strikes a balance between, the risks on
both sides of that equation. With respect to any particular legal rule, perhaps
the right question is not which set of risks to choose, but how much risk of
convicting the innocent is acceptable against the risk that the legal rules and
structures we adopt will result in too many guilty defendants going free. In
terms of the legal debate over Stand Your Ground laws, that would suggest
looking for a way of incorporating both sets of concerns-those supporting
Retreat and No Retreat rules-into a functional legal standard. In sum: how
might we structure the law of Retreat and Stand Your Ground so that it
acknowledges, and minimizes, the dual risks of convicting the innocent and
of acquitting the guilty? The presumption of innocence establishes the im-
portance of acknowledging and attempting to avoid the risk of convicting
innocent people. But is there also there a substantial risk that adopting
Stand Your Ground rules will result in the acquittal of defendants who are,
in fact, guilty of unlawful homicide?
Although the nationwide evidence is not yet conclusive on this
point, some interesting case law in Florida suggests that there is such a risk.
The Florida cases collected by the Tampa Bay Times in 2012 illustrate the
problem."' Recall that the Times looked into almost two hundred Florida
homicide cases in which Stand Your Ground claims had been made since
the state passed its No Retreat rule in 2005.167 Based on these cases, the
newspaper reported a number of disturbing issues with the invocation and
enforcement of Florida's Stand Your Ground statute. The main problems
identified were:
(1) Stand Your Ground has led to similar cases being treated dif-
ferently by courts and prosecutors.' 68
(2) Stand Your Ground has been successfully invoked in a number
of cases-for example, where the defendant killed another per-
son during a dispute in the midst of an illegal drug deal-in
which such acquittal is morally repugnant and seems outside
the contemplation of the statute.1 6 9
166. Kris Hundley et al., Florida 'stand your ground' law yields some shocking outcomes depend-
ing on how law is applied, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Jun. 1, 2012 11:25 AM),
http://www.tampabay.com/news/publicsafety/crime/florida-stand-your-ground-law-yields-some-
shocking-outcomes-depending-on/1233133.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id
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(3) Vagaries in the statutory standard have produced different rul-
ings that have in turn impacted case law in contradictory
ways. 170
(4) Although Florida's statutory law clearly bars initial aggressors
from successfully claiming self-defense,"' defendants who
provoked the confrontation that resulted in the victim's death
have successfully walked free under Stand Your Ground.
(5) In Florida, at least, the Stand Your Ground law is being over-
used, in both homicide and non-homicide cases, thanks to the
increased incentive it creates for defendants to argue self-
defense.1 72
At the very least, it appears that many legal actors charged with ar-
guing and interpreting the Florida law are confused about its purpose, reach,
and conceptual limits. Looking more closely at the facts of the Times cases
makes this impression even stronger.173 The Times, for example, reported
that nearly 70% of defendants making Stand Your Ground claims went
free.174 And this result occurred despite the fact that of the 75 Times cases in
which the defendant was acquitted following a determination that his or her
use of deadly force was justified, the great majority did not match the Stand
Your Ground paradigm of an innocent defender, threatened with imminent
and deadly force from an unprovoked attack, standing his ground and meet-
ing force with force to save his own life."' Some cases did match the para-
digm, either partially or completely, suggesting that the Stand Your Ground
statute may sometimes accomplish the job for which it was designed.176 But
in most cases the facts were much more ambiguous: cases of arguments
turned violent where it was often unclear "who started it" or even who first
brought a deadly weapon to the fight; domestic disputes turned violent gang
shootouts; killings between drug dealers during a deal gone bad, or killings
during the commission of a felony in which both shooter and homicide vic-
tim were both participating; or killings which (though a Stand Your Ground
claim was apparently made during the adjudication process) would proba-
bly have afforded the defendant a self-defense claim even in a Retreat juris-
diction (for example, where at the moment the defendant was faced with
deadly force, there was no possibility of safe retreat or where a reasonable
person could have perceived that to be true)."'
170. Id.
17 1. Id.
172. Id.
173. Many thanks to my research assistant, Eric Speer, for invaluable assistance in compiling the
numbers for this section.
174. See Darla Cameron & William M. Higgins, Florida's Stand Your Ground Law, TAMPA BAY
TIMES (Oct. 1, 2014), http://www.tampabay.com/stand-your-ground-law/fatal-cases (compiling statistics
for Stand Your Ground cases).
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
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At least in Florida, it seems, the cases indicate that many defend-
ants are being acquitted under Stand Your Ground statutes even though
their cases bear little resemblance to the paradigm Stand Your Ground situ-
ation.17 8 As a group, the Florida cases reveal the lack of a limiting principle
that clearly tells defendants, lawyers, and judges which cases will likely fall
within the protection of the Stand Your Ground rule and which will not. In
some instances, it appears that the law is working as anticipated, but in
many more it seems that the legal actors charged with implementing the law
have no clear conception of what a Stand Your Ground case should look
like or how it fits into the underlying justification of self-defense. If this is
true, then the highly charged political debate over Stand Your Ground laws
may have little or no relevance to the real problems with these statutes or
with the correct remedies for solving those problems. On the contrary, the
cases suggest not the presence of racial animus, or gun-craziness, but the
need to introduce a doctrinal boundary that clearly articulates the reach and
the boundaries of Stand Your Ground and Retreat. In the next section, I ar-
gue that the principle of necessity, already the conceptual backdrop to the
justification of self-defense, should serve as that boundary.
B. Necessity, Retreat, and Stand Your Ground
For centuries courts and scholars have recognized that the right of
self-defense grows from, and is limited by, the overarching rule of necessi-
ty. The use of deadly force against another person is justifiable only when
"no other course of action is possible." 7 9 In United States v. Peterson,"s
the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals succinctly captured the
history: "Self-defense, as a doctrine legally exonerating the taking of human
life, is as viable now as it was in Blackstone's time . . . But '[t]he law of
self-defense is a law of necessity;' the right of self-defense arises only when
the necessity begins, and equally ends with the necessity . . . ."'"' That ne-
cessity offers the primary ground for a valid claim of self-defense is a prin-
ciple as old as the defense.1 82
178. A development that has not escaped commentators. See, e.g., GRUBER, supra note 20, at 964,
993 (discussing cases such as those listed by Cameron & Higgins, supra note 175174). Professor Gruber
argues that the media focus on Stand Your Ground as a flawed (but not racist) policy has "de-linked" the
Zimmerman-Martin case from important issues of race, and racist invocation and implementation of the
law (by agents of the state such as the police), that ought to be the focus of public conversation about the
case. Id. After surveying the empirical evidence Gruber concludes that Stand Your Ground itself is not
inherently racist; she urges political progressives to consider that the "punitive impulse" which may fuel
their opposition to Stand Your Ground reinforces the "neoliberal" vision of individual responsibility for
crime and could ultimately "bolster the existing racist, classist, and masculinist American penal state."
Id.
179. See infra text accompanying Part V Subsection C (discussing strict necessity in the criminal
law).
180. United States v. Peterson, 483 F.2d 1222 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
181. Id. at 1229 (quoting Holmes v. United States, II F.2d 569, 574 (1926)).
182. See id. at 1231 (stating that self-defense and necessity "runs deep" in the law).
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The original Retreat and No Retreat rules developed from this doc-
trine.183 Over time, we have come to view them as separate, from each other
and from the principle of necessity that gave birth to them both. But viewed
in the context of their historical roots, it becomes clear that the two ap-
proaches are really just different aspects of the same thing-that is, they are
mutually compatible sets of rules governing when a person may, or may
not, resort to the use of deadly force when facing a deadly attack from
which there may be a possibility of retreat.
It is unfortunate that the modem statutes seem to treat necessity as a
separate matter from the question of Stand or Retreat. Consider the lan-
guage of Florida's Stand Your Ground law (which, again, has become the
model for similar statutes across the country):
A person is justified in using or threatening to use deadly force if
he or she reasonably believes that using or threatening to use
such force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily
harm to himself or herself or another[,] or to prevent the immi-
nent commission of a forcible felony. A person who uses or
threatens to use deadly force in accordance with this subsection
does not have a duty to retreat and has the right to stand his or
her ground if the person using or threatening to use the deadly
force is not engaged in a criminal activity and is in a place where
he or she has a right to be. 184
Notice that this Stand Your Ground law contains two main sec-
tions: (1) a section establishing the rule of necessity as the basis for a claim
of self-defense, and (2) a section establishing a No Retreat rule under the
conditions therein. But assuming that (1) applies, what explains the pres-
ence of (2)? The core principle of necessity provides that a claim of self-
defense will not be allowed unless the defendant who makes the claim rea-
sonably believed, at the time the defendant used deadly force against an at-
tacker, that the defendant had no other way of retreating.18' As a logical
matter, if safe Retreat was possible and the defendant knew that, then the
use of deadly force was not necessary. If safe Retreat was not possible, or
the defendant did not know about the possibility of a retreat, then the de-
fender's use of force may have been necessary.
This suggests that as separate, freestanding provisions of a statute
or of a common-law defense, both Stand Your Ground and Retreat rules are
either redundant or internally incoherent. In a Stand Your Ground jurisdic-
tion, if the defendant's action satisfied the rule of necessity-that is, the de-
fendant stood his or her ground and killed the attacker only because he or
183. See supra text accompanying Part 11 Subsection B.
184. FLA. STAT. § 776.012(2) (2014) (emphasis added).
185. See supra text accompanying notes 27-28 (discussing the centrality of necessity to a self-
defense claim).
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she reasonably believed there was no other way of preserving his or her
own life-then the No Retreat rule in the statute is redundant. If the defend-
ant could have safely retreated from the deadly confrontation and knew at
the time that the defendant could do so-then the defendant's actions do not
satisfy the requirement of necessity and should not be deemed legally justi-
fied. In that case the presence of a Stand Your Ground rule seems to flatly
contradict the necessity requirement-to say that, although it was not strict-
ly necessary to use deadly force, the defendant did so anyway because the
defendant chose to stand and shoot rather than to retreat in complete safety.
A parallel conclusion follows from the presence of Retreat rules in
statutes or common-law decisions. In Maryland, for example, state court
precedents have made clear that (1) a person has a general duty to retreat
before using deadly force outside the home, and (2) such duty does not ap-
ply if "the peril of the defendant was imminent."' Again, the rule of ne-
cessity implies both-if a person can safely retreat and knows it, he or she
should do so before using deadly force, but if there is no time to retreat
safely because the attacker is just about to strike, then the only reasonable
means of saving his or her own life or avoiding serious injury may be to
strike first.' A separate rule of Retreat is at best redundant and at worst
confusing-perhaps suggesting to a jury that the duty to retreat applies
whether or not the facts show that the defendant actually thought about the
possibility of retreat or was aware, at the time of the deadly confrontation,
that a completely safe retreat was possible. Recall that such concerns about
the Retreat rule animated the court's decision in the Culverson case.' As a
separate and freestanding element of the doctrine, the Retreat rule, in prac-
tice, may be more confusing than enlightening.
Of course it could be that Stand Your Ground rules are intended as
exceptions to the necessity element-that although the elements of self-
defense usually require a defendant to establish that his or her use of deadly
force was strictly necessary, in cases involving possible retreat the necessity
requirement should give way to the defendant's right to use deadly force,
despite the known availability of a safe means of escape. Such an interpre-
tation might rescue some of the statutory standards from the charge that
they are redundant or incoherent on their face. But this reading creates its
own-major-problem, a problem revealed by the preceding discussion of
Florida's Stand Your Ground cases': Severed from its rightful home with-
in the principle of necessity, Stand Your Ground rules appear to have few,
if any, conceptual boundaries. Whatever the legislative intent, Stand or Re-
treat rules require clear boundaries that can give them more predictive value
and guide their interpretation and implementation in case law.
186. See cases cited supra note 2 (defining retreat rule in Maryland).
187. Remember that imminence, for purposes of self-defense, means, "just about to happen." See
cases and materials cited supra Part Il1.B (defining imminence under standard doctrine).
188. Culverson v. State, 797 P.2d 238, 240 (Nev. 1990).
I89. Supra text accompanying Part V Subsection B.
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C. A Doctrinal Fix
At some point, the issue of Stand Your Ground or Retreat became
detached from its proper home within the necessity principle, establishing
itself as a separate element in the law of self-defense. It may be that the
roots of this phenomenon lie in the English law's early determination to as-
sert the King's privilege against the use of self-help in homicide cases,190
and that enforcing a Duty to Retreat before using deadly force made good
sense against a legal backdrop in which the relative lack of police and offi-
cial law enforcement meant that self-help was both common and justifiable
in a variety of contexts. Over time, perhaps an unintended consequence was
that the Duty to Retreat became an independent source of concern that led
to the widespread common-law endorsement in the United States of the
Stand Your Ground approach, beginning in the nineteenth century. Struc-
turally, the result has been a kind of doctrinal seesaw that tilts from Retreat
to No Retreat while largely ignoring the fact that both the Stand Your
Ground and Retreat concepts are properly housed within the principle of
strict necessity that provides the overarching justification of self-defense in
the first place.
Regardless of the particular historical reason, current realities argue
for the return of both the Retreat and Stand Your Ground rules to their natu-
ral source, as aspects of the core necessity element in self-defense. Con-
tained within that principle, both rules have essential roles to play in a doc-
trinal setting in which the fundamental necessity principle sets appropriate
limits to their operation.
One can imagine various ways of restructuring the law to incorpo-
rate this idea. Here I will suggest only one. Consider Florida's current self-
defense statute, which says, "A person is justified in using or threatening to
use deadly force if he or she reasonably believes that using or threatening to
use such force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm
to himself or herself or to prevent the imminent commission of a forcible
felony."' 9 ' This language succinctly enacts the traditional elements of self-
defense, including the foundational principle of necessity. A second sen-
tence, which would clarify the standard for juries and other legal actors,
might read: "In deciding whether the use of deadly force was necessary in a
particular case, the following factors shall be considered: (1) whether, as an
objective matter, and considering all the circumstances, the defendant could
have avoided the use of deadly force by retreating from the confrontation in
complete safety; and (2) whether, as a subjective matter, the defendant actu-
ally knew that he or she could have safely retreated. If the facts demonstrate
that no safe retreat was available; that the defendant honestly and reasona-
190. See, e.g., 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 184-85
(Oxford, Clarendon Press 1769) ("[Tihe king and his courts are the vindices injuriarum, and will give to
the party wronged all the satisfaction he deserves.").
191. FLA. STAT. § 776.012(2) (2014).
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bly believed there was no time to retreat before responding with deadly
force; or that the defendant was not actually aware of the possibility of re-
treat or that such retreat would be completely safe, then the court or jury
shall find that the defendant had no duty to retreat and had the right to stand
his or her ground and respond to the threat with deadly force. It shall be the
burden of the prosecution to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the de-
fendant was in fact aware of the possibility of retreat and was aware that
such retreat would be completely safe."
Such language would simultaneously affirm the principle of neces-
sity as the overarching rule governing self-defense; clarify the conditions
under which both the Stand Your Ground and Retreat doctrines are relevant
to deciding whether a defendant's use of deadly force was justified or not;
and help judges, juries, and attorneys determine both when to invoke a de-
fendant's right to stand the defendant's ground and when to conclude that
the right was properly exercised.
This language does not perfectly answer the concerns posed by
courts that have adopted Stand Your Ground rules. For example, if the Cul-
verson court is right that Retreat rules, by their very existence, give a struc-
tural advantage to unlawful attackers over innocent defenders,'9 2 then the
explicit attempt to validate both the principles of Retreat and Stand Your
Ground within the overarching boundary of necessity might not eliminate
this problem. Other solutions are certainly possible. The important point
here is that finding, and vetting, such solutions requires careful, focused,
and deliberative attention to the function of self-defense law as well as its
history and its core doctrinal elements.
D. Beyond Politics: Toward an Independent Role for the Law
Necessity has always been the basis of self-defense, and other
courts and commentators have noted its connection to the Retreat rule and
Stand Your Ground.' However, over time the doctrinal seesaw between
Stand Your Ground and Retreat, reflected both in older common-law deci-
sions on the issue and in recently enacted statutes rejecting the Duty to Re-
treat in favor of Stand Your Ground, has pushed the role of necessity into
the background. The political controversy over Stand Your Ground, focused
on ideologically loaded issues such as racism and the right to own guns, has
only exacerbated this problem. The real problem is that as freestanding el-
ements of self-defense, separate from the overarching principle of necessity,
No Retreat rules may generate results in particular cases that are very far
afield from the limited justification that self-defense was meant to give.' 94
192. See Culverson, 797 P.2d at 240 ("[A] rule requiring a non-aggressor to retreat confers a bene-
fit on the aggressor and a detriment on the non-aggressor.").
193. See, e.g., United States v. Peterson, 483 F.2d 1222, 1229-30 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (making clear
the importance of necessity to self-defense).
194. As mentioned above in note 162, some evidence indicates that this may already have oc-
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Similarly, Duties to Retreat, unbound from the necessity principle, pose the
risk of confusing juries or other legal actors as to the conditions under
which a defendant may justifiably stand her ground and use deadly force
against an imminent deadly attack.' Returned to their natural home within
the rubric of necessity, both rules can play important roles in helping the
law decide when, and when not, to justify the fatal use of deadly force by a
private citizen.
The above suggests one doctrinal answer to the debate between Re-
treat and Stand Your Ground. But the issue also offers a chance to engage a
much larger conversation, focusing not on the structure of the law but on
how we talk about it.
If the argument here is persuasive, it demonstrates a complete sepa-
ration between the politics of Stand Your Ground and the real problems it
creates for the law. That should bother us. Our political debate about this
issue has shoved the legal issues into the midst of bitter and longstanding
disputes about racism and private gun ownership. By contrast, identifying
and solving the legal problems posed by Stand Your Ground and Retreat
requires calmer and more lawyer-like skills. It requires close attention to the
history and structure of both rules, to the moral intuitions that have support-
ed their existence for centuries, and to any demonstrable issues that recent
case law may suggest they present for our justice system today. In the latter
endeavor, the content of our political debate on this topic has not been
merely useless; it has been harmful. Sometimes political controversy can
usefully inform the law. But politics can also generate discussions about
law reform which (1) distract our collective attention from facts that might
really point the way to a better legal standard; (2) intimidate those in the le-
gal and political communities who would otherwise be open to considering
and acting on those facts; and (3) lend strength to the view that the law has
no independent role to play in thinking about issues of justice, but is simply
a weapon of the socially powerful or the loudest political action group of
the moment. This is what has happened in the debate over Stand Your
Ground, and it should alert us to the need for a deeper conversation about
how we decide which legal issues to act upon, and which reasons should
count in favor of such action.
The law, in short, must stand its own ground against ideology-
driven pressures for reform. Law is not reducible to politics; conversations
about legal change should not become ideologically driven food fights; and
we are unlikely to find the right legal answers unless we think carefully
about the law's core mission, its fundamental structure, and the complex set
of intuitions about justice that drive its evolution.
curred in Florida since the passage of its Stand Your Ground statute in 2005.
195. See Leider, supra note 5 ("Prosecutors have an easier time proving that a combatant could
have safely withdrawn than they do convincing juries, beyond any reasonable doubt, that the person did
not reasonably believe that he was in danger.").
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